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A N S W E R 3

To the latter Part of  
LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
LETTERS on the Study of HISTORY.

BY THE LATE  
LORD WALPOLE of *WOOLVERTON*.

In a Series of Letters to a NOBLE LORD.

PART I. and II. 2 B e



LONDON: Printed by W. RICHARDSON and S. CLARK. 1762.

from Lord Walpole

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A M S W E R

LORD BOLINGBROKE

Letter of the 17th of April 1734

LORD WALTON



LONDON: Printed by W. Baskett, at the ...



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L E T T E R S

T O A

N O B L E L O R D.

P A R T I.

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LETTERS

LETTERS

TO A

NOBLE LORD

PART I



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# LETTERS

TO A

NOBLE LORD.

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## LETTER I.

MY LORD,

**Y**OUR Lordship is pleased to let me know, by the honour of your letter of —, that, in perusing that part of the late Lord BOLINGBROKE's posthumous works, intituled, \* *A sketch of the history and state of Europe, from 1688 to the conclusion of*

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\* Letter the eighth, in the second volume of Lord BOLINGBROKE's letters on the study of history, octavo edition, 1752.

*the peace of Utrecht*, you observe, that the author, in defence of the administration (when he himself was a principal manager in negotiating that famous transaction, and in pursuing the measures to bring it about) is very bold and dogmatic in his assertions, employs much art and colouring to set them off to the best advantage, and to make superficial and imaginary notions, void of all proof or argument, however embellished with agreeable turns of wit and expression, pass for realities; that to divert the reader's attention from the object of truth, he takes great pains (the usual resource of a weak cause) to calumniate others: all the confederate powers, and the characters of those who had the chief conduct of the glorious war against the common enemy, are attacked with great acrimony; as if they industriously protracted it, from selfish views of interest and ambition, without any intention to make a safe and honourable peace, which the success of the allied arms, by the reduction of the power and pride of LEWIS the Fourteenth, might have procured; and which that humbled monarch had sincerely offered, earnestly sued for, and would have concluded, even upon their own terms: and if the peace of Utrecht (as the author is forced to confess) was by no means answerable to the immense expence, and the victorious efforts of the confederate arms; if France was  
not



not obliged to make such concessions as were necessary to reduce her within due bounds, and to give her neighbours a sufficient security against future invasions; all was entirely owing to those, who opposed the ministry at the latter end of Queen ANNE's reign, in every step they took for obtaining this great and salutary end.

YOUR Lordship observes farther, that notwithstanding these positive assertions, displayed with great assurance, and in a plausible and amusing style, you can easily see through the fallacious and deceitful veil of so partial and malicious a representation: for although you were not born at that memorable epoch, yet by the information you have had, from persons of undoubted credit and judgment, who were perfectly well instructed, as having not only a knowledge of, but a share in, what passed at that important juncture; and from what you have read in memorials, and papers written with great strength of reason on that subject, when the evidence of facts was fresh and glaring, you long since formed, and have not yet altered the opinion—That the four last years of the administration in Queen ANNE's reign presented a scene, the most iniquitous that was ever brought upon the stage of public affairs;—that instead of endeavouring to reduce within due bounds the exorbitant power of France; to

- re-establish the balance and tranquillity of Europe; to secure, in particular, our present happy constitution, and the commerce of this nation, upon a solid and lasting foundation, which great blessings Providence, by an uninterrupted series of wonderful advantages, that had attended for many years the common cause against France, had enabled the allies to obtain; and which they were in a way, and even upon the point, of obtaining; your Lordship is convinced, that all these hopeful expectations of reaping the fruit of so much blood and treasure (which from the nature and situation of things seemed infallible) were blasted and confounded on a sudden, by the prevailing intrigues of a faction, composed of some few ambitious and designing men, in concert with a new favourite lady, who had gained the affections of the Queen:—that, the Duchess of MARLBOROUGH being disgraced, her near relations, a TREASURER of the greatest integrity and abilities, and the bravest and most fortunate GENERAL that ever was at the head of an army, were removed:—that these new projectors, impatient to succeed and support themselves in their places, broke through the barriers of honour, honesty, and good faith; and giving up all concern, not only for the interest of our friends, but of their own country, without any other motive or provocation than that of satisfying their wicked  
and



and aspiring views at any rate, and in order to bring in the Pretender, flung themselves into the arms of France.

THAT, far from steadily insisting upon (as before this unaccountable change it was practicable and in their power to have done) terms of peace, agreeable to treaties, and to the principles upon which those treaties were founded, they were forced to receive the law from her, and accept of such conditions as she would condescend to give to us and our allies; and while we shamefully abandoned them, far from obtaining, as was pretended, particular advantages to this nation, as a satisfaction for our having borne the chief burden of the war: what was peculiarly granted to us, was calculated to dazzle the eyes of the unthinking multitude; being of no benefit to us, but productive (as they afterwards proved) of new troubles in Europe.

THE most interesting and essential considerations for securing and increasing our foreign commerce were sacrificed in a most ignominious manner; and lastly, the foundation of the protestant succession in this royal family, the bulwark of our laws, liberties, and religion, was so shaken, that, at the time of Queen ANNE's death, it was in a very hazardous and tottering condition.

THIS

THIS is the light (and indeed a very true one it is) in which your Lordship still sees the negociations of those times, when stripped of the artful dress with which this author labours to disguise them.

HOWEVER, you seem apprehensive that the affirmation of so bold a pen, varnished with a variety of lively ideas, may make an impression in favour of that extraordinary performance, upon the minds of unwary readers, even of friends to the present settlement, and principles of our government, who perhaps were not born till after this political convulsion; unless some intelligent and well-intentioned person who then lived, and by being conversant with the transactions of those days, had an opportunity of knowing the truth, would, by stating only matters of fact, without any other dress or ornament than that of plain reasoning, and consequences flowing from undeniable premises, endeavour to unmask this political *Charlatan*, and expose his pretended erudition and veracity in their proper colours; and your Lordship is pleased to recommend this task to me, as being no stranger to this unaccountable revolution in the state of Europe.

I HAVE



I HAVE already told your Lordship, that it seems to me an unnecessary undertaking; and that any one, who will give himself the trouble to have recourse to the papers called the *Medley*, to the several tracts written by Dr. HARE, late bishop of Chichester, relating to the management of the war, to the negotiations of the preliminaries of peace at the Hague in 1709, and at Gertruydenburgh in 1710; the report of the secret committee in 1715, founded chiefly upon Lord BOLINGBROKE'S own papers; the *barrier treaty vindicated*; BURNET'S history of his own times; and M. LAMBERTI'S memoirs, will find, that what your Lordship proposes is fully performed; and that the strong assertions, advanced by the author of the sketch with such an assuming and dictatorial air, and which by the help of his magic lantern appear to be something, are, as he says himself of the systems of some philosophers, nothing but appearances. It would therefore be sufficient to refer the impartial reader, who seems charmed at first sight with this entertaining novel (for a mere novel it is) to a careful perusal of those tracts, and the charm will soon be dissolved; the pleasing ideas, confronted with naked truth, will immediately vanish, and leave nothing to be seen but a mixture of iniquity and falsehood.

BUT

BUT your Lordship, not satisfied with this answer, is pleased to tell me, that the generality of mankind see or care to see no farther, than what is immediately before their eyes: the present object strikes their imagination, and mere curiosity will never engage them to look back to times and actions long since past, in order to be awakened from their illusions, and to discover the real characters of persons, and certainty of facts, for whom or wherein they are not directly concerned. Neither can your Lordship's more generous and candid disposition suffer without indignation, that ministers of the greatest honesty and capacity that ever sat at the helm of government, who employed their utmost zeal and the wisest measures to retrieve and fix the balance of power and the peace of Europe upon a lasting basis, and to advance the honour and interest of this nation to a degree much beyond what it ever was in the most flourishing reigns before, should be petulantly traduced and calumniated by the virulent pen of one, who values himself for having been instrumental in disappointing the glorious intentions and ends of those wise measures, and would erect a monument of praise to his own memory, for having been the principal actor in such a scene of iniquity.

IN



IN short, I find your Lordship grows warm; and you tell me, that you cannot with patience think, that the present age and posterity should be deluded by a specious and false representation of such important transactions; and be made to believe, contrary to the nature of things, that virtue was vice, and vice virtue; that patriots were traitors, and traitors patriots; that Tully was an enemy, and Catiline a friend, to the liberties of Rome; or, which is the same thing, that the councils and conduct of the ministers in the first eight years of Queen ANNE's reign tended to destroy, and those of the ministers of the four last years of that reign to preserve, the balance of power in Europe, and the grandeur, interests, and safety of these kingdoms. Your Lordship is afraid, that these misrepresentations, false and absurd as they are, should begin now to gain credit by the confident assertions in this posthumous romance; which may greatly increase, and prevail hereafter, if the gilding be not wiped off from the venomous pill, and some antidote administered to prevent the fatal effects of the poison; and therefore you insist upon it, that since I am now at leisure, I should set about so meritorious a work; not only as a lover of truth and of my country, but for other reasons, that ought to be a personal inducement to engage me in it.

My very great regard for your Lordship, and the motives you mention, have made such an impression upon me, that I will endeavour to obey your commands; depending upon the force of undoubted facts, and plain and natural inferences from them, without the additional and deceitful help of rhetorical flowers, artful turns, and quaint antitheses; which, while they serve to raise and please the passions, keep right reason and sound judgment at a distance; and without any personal prejudice, which often prevents our seeing objects in their true light.

Do not, my Lord, the length of this introduction, or rather apology for myself, begin to make you repent of your importunity, on account of the trouble you are like to have from my subsequent letters? But your Lordship will remember, that you have drawn it upon yourself: however, it is time to release you at present.

L E T T E R



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## LETTER II.

**I** Now proceed to perform the promise I made your Lordship in my last.

THAT the merits of the question may be thoroughly canvassed and well understood, it seems necessary to make a deduction of the great progress of the power of France, as it gradually increased, by the co-operation of the sword and pen, from the treaty of Munster in 1648, to the revolution in England, and the forming of the first grand alliance in 1689; at which time the languishing condition of King CHARLES the Second of Spain had struck all Europe with a panic, lest the grandeur of France, already raised to an enormous height, should, by the possible union of those two crowns, upon the death of that prince without issue, become so exorbitant, as to attain to universal monarchy.

I SHALL then endeavour to state and explain the various engagements, relative to the succession of Spain,

which the maritime powers contracted with other potentates, for their common security against the house of Bourbon, according to the circumstances of affairs, and the events of the war from 1689 to 1703.

I SHALL then take a general review of the operations of the war, and the consequences of them in the several parts of Europe, from 1703 to the end of 1706, and observe what steps were made towards a peace during that time; on which occasion I shall take notice of the forced constructions, which the author of the sketch has put upon the articles of the grand alliance of 1701, and refute the groundless assertion advanced by him from thence, without the least colour of truth, that France offered in 1706 to make, with the allies, a safe and honourable peace upon the principles of that treaty.

I SHALL afterwards proceed to state the subsequent events of the war, from 1706 to 1709 and 1710; and put in a true light the negotiations for peace during the two last years; by which it will appear, that there was no reason to doubt, but the allies might have been able to recover Spain and the West Indies out of the hands of the house of Bourbon, in favour of that of Austria, had not the administration in England been changed in 1710.

I SHALL



I SHALL then examine the conduct of the new administration in England, from 1710 to the conclusion of the general peace, in concert with France, by the treaties of Utrecht in 1713; and whether the honour, safety, and trade of this nation were consulted in those particularly made for England at that time.

CARDINAL RICHELIEU projected and far advanced the famous plan, not only for making the French king absolute in his own dominions, but, by extending those dominions, to aggrandize the power of the house of Bourbon with the reduction of that of the house of Austria.

CARDINAL MAZARIN \* succeeded to the same authority; and adopting the same principles, brought that plan to perfection; and carried it so far, as to lay the foundation of a design to unite the crowns of France and Spain.

THE wonderful and unexpected turns of fortune in favour of MAZARIN's policy and projects, both at home and abroad, inspired him with a sagacity to foresee the possibility of forming so great a scheme, and with a reso-

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\* 1642.

lution to meditate and prepare the means for making it succeed.

DURING the \* negotiations for a peace at Munster, he ventured to open his thoughts to the French plenipotentiaries on this object so early as in 1646. He tells them, That “ if his most Christian majesty, by marrying the “ infanta of Spain, could have the Low Countries and “ Franche Comté, we (the French) should have *tout le* “ *solide*; for we might then aspire to the succession of “ Spain, notwithstanding any renunciations which the “ infanta would be obliged to make; and this might not “ be a very distant expectation, because there is only the “ life of her brother that can exclude us from it.”

THE French ministers at Munster seemed indeed to conceive no good opinion of so distant and improbable an idea, but the Cardinal never lost sight of it. The imperial branch of the house of Austria was humbled by the conditions of that treaty, and the arms of France, after the † conclusion of it, continued successful against the Spaniards: the proposal of a marriage between LEWIS the Fourteenth and the infanta, which some

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\* 1646.

† 1648.



time before had been refused by Spain, was at last accepted, and concluded with the \* Pyrenean treaty, fourteen years after the first notion of it had been entertained by MAZARIN, without any other provision, guaranty, or security, to prevent the union of the two monarchies, besides that of renunciations ; which the Cardinal, and indeed PHILIP the Fourth himself, looked upon as void at the time of making them.

WHEN LEWIS the Fourteenth, upon the † death of Cardinal MAZARIN, took the reins of government into his own hands, he never quitted this great object : all the wars he engaged in, all his intrigues in foreign courts, and all the treaties he made, were calculated to promote the success of it. He increased his power, and extended his dominions, without any regard to justice, right, or public faith, that he might be able to support that claim, when the case should exist ; well knowing, that such an immoderate accession of greatness would alarm the rest of the potentates of Europe.

UPON the ‡ death of PHILIP the Fourth, his father-in-law, he immediately claimed, seized, and || entered

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\* 1659. † 1661. ‡ 1665. || 1667.  
upon

upon a considerable part of the Low Countries and Franche Comté, as a pretended devolution to him, in right of his queen, notwithstanding they had both, in the strongest terms that could be imagined, renounced all pretensions to any part of the Spanish dominions; a plain indication, and indeed a declaration, of his intentions to pretend to that intire monarchy upon its being open.

THE rapid progress of his arms was checked for a short time by the \* triple alliance between England, Sweden, and the States General; and he was obliged by the † treaty of Aix la Chapelle to restore Franche Comté; but he retained many important places and territories, that he had taken in the Netherlands.

HIS dominions were augmented by that peace; his ambition was for a while suspended, but not satisfied; he made preparations for a new war. He soon gained by brigues and corruptions the courts of England and Sweden; which ‡ dissolved the triple alliance: he saw the weakness of Spain, the jealousy and envy of the Empire against the States General, the divisions arising in the

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\* 1668.

† 1668.

‡ 1671.

Dutch



Dutch government, the bad condition of their land forces, and the indifference of the court of Vienna, in which he had gained a secret influence: he saw all these advantages, and did not fail to make good use of them.

ANIMATED with a spirit of glory and revenge, and strengthened by an unaccountable union with England, at the head of innumerable and irresistible forces, he over-ran like a torrent the United Provinces; and within the space of three months made himself master of three of them.

THE other powers of Europe, astonished at this sudden inundation of conquests, were at last roused from their lethargy; some of those who joined with him at first in this war, † withdrew themselves from his alliance; others engaged with great zeal in defence of the States General, as a common concern.

‡ LEWIS the Fourteenth, abandoned by his allies, and left to support himself by his own forces, had recourse to his never-failing artifice, to amuse and divide the allies by negotiations. His plenipotentiaries exerted

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† 1672.

D

‡ 1674.

their

their talents at a congress, while his generals continued to pursue their victories in the field. A dextrous and successful management of the art of treating and fighting at the same time, obliged his enemies to come into a \* peace at Nimeguen, on conditions dictated by himself; the possession of Franche Comté was confirmed to him, with an additional increase of other towns and territories.

HE now obtained the title of LE GRAND, even from foreigners: elevated to so great a height of power and pride, he was adored as more than mortal by his subjects. He valued himself as not only equal to any, but superior to all the other potentates of Europe together.

THE powers engaged against him in the last war had reduced their extraordinary forces in consequence of the peace; he continued as well armed as ever: the peace was no interruption to his acquisitions. A council established at † Brisac re-united by a decree several districts pretended to have been dismembered from Alsace; and a decree of the chamber of Metz re-united several others, as dismembered from the three bishopricks: the king

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\* 1678.

† 1680.

himself



himself was judge and party in his own cause, and he passed an edict for the execution of those decrees.

THE princes dispossessed of their lordships, which they had enjoyed from time immemorial, found no other redress than complaints and protestations: his minister LOUVOIS, by the force of intrigues, money, and menaces, \* got possession of Strasbourg.

THE same year Casal, a capital city of Montferrat, was sold and delivered up to the Marquis of BOUFFLERS.

THE refusal of Spain to yield Alost, demanded by France, as having been forgot to be inserted in the conditions of the last peace, was a sufficient reason for the † blockade of Luxembourg.

‡ COURTRAY, Dixmude, and Luxembourg were surrendered to France: the situation of Europe was such, that there was no other way to stop the progress of her arms, but that of unactive guaranties and fruitless negotiations; the Imperialists and Spaniards treated at Ratisbon with her, whilst her generals were employed in

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\* 1681.

† 1682.

‡ 1683, 1684.

taking their towns. The conferences there at last converted the peace of Nimeguen into a truce of twenty years ; by which France kept Luxembourg : this was but a weak security to prevent future hostilities. No treaty, truce, or peace, laid any restraint or obligation upon LEWIS the Fourteenth ; the end of one war was in a manner the beginning of another.

THESE frequent violations of public faith without any foundation of right ; the many invasions without the least provocation ; the cruelties exercised where the French arms prevailed ; and the encouragement given to the Turk to make war upon the Christians, raised at last a general hatred and indignation against the crown of France in most of the princes of Europe, even in those who had been her best friends.

THE famous league of Augsbourg, projected in 1686, of which the prince of Orange was the first mover, was concluded in 1687, between the emperor and the king of Spain ; several princes and circles of the empire, and even the king of Sweden, became a party to it, out of resentment for the seizure of Deux Ponts belonging to that crown by the French, who were arrived to that pitch of haughtiness, as to spare neither friend nor foe.

BUT



BUT the Revolution, which providentially happened at this critical juncture in England, from whence, during the weak, profligate, and corrupt reigns of King CHARLES the Second and King JAMES the Second, no assistance could be expected against France, contributed most effectually to give a new turn to the state of affairs in Europe.

\* THE prince of Orange, at the same time king of Great Britain and stadtholder of Holland, endued with the talents of a great politician and hero, a determined enemy, from public views, to LEWIS the Fourteenth, and sensible of the dangers that threatened the liberties of Europe, if the king of Spain, who was then in a bad state of health, should die, became the head and heart of a confederacy, composed of almost all the powers of Europe. By his authority and influence the first grand alliance, in order to withstand the exorbitant power of France, was projected and concluded in 1689.

I SHOULD now proceed to state and explain the various engagements of that and other treaties, relative to the succession of the Spanish monarchy, which the mari-

time powers contracted with other potentates, for their common security against the house of Bourbon, according to the circumstances of affairs and the events of war, from 1689 to 1703: but this must be the subject of another letter.

LETTER



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## LETTER III.

**B**Y the grand alliance of 1689 \* it was agreed, That no peace should be made, until the peace of Westphalia, Osnabrug, and Munster, and also the Pyrenean treaty, should be vindicated, and all things of an ecclesiastical and political concern restored to their ancient state.

FRANCE having published in divers places and courts, that notwithstanding her solemn renunciations, she would by force of arms incessantly endeavour to assert the succession to the Spanish monarchy for the dauphin; † it was agreed, That in case the king of Spain should die without lawful heirs, the contracting parties would assist with all their forces his Imperial majesty to get and keep his lawful succession to the Spanish monarchy, and all the rights and dominions belonging to it, and maintain him in the possession of them against the French and all

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\* Art. 4.

† Separate article.

their adherents that should directly or indirectly oppose it.

YOUR Lordship will observe, that nothing less than the reducing of France to the terms of the treaty of Westphalia and the Pyrenees, and securing the whole Spanish monarchy to his Imperial majesty upon the death of King CHARLES the Second, was thought sufficient to preserve the liberties of Europe against so perfidious and terrible a neighbour.

THIS system was not rash and precipitate; did not proceed (as the author of the sketch would intimate) from a spirit of pure revenge, but was founded upon the first principle of human nature, self-defence. The cruel experience of a long train of infidelities and outrages perpetrated by France near thirty years, made these engagements reasonable, just, and necessary, in order to reduce and keep her ambitious and overbearing power within proper bounds.

\* THE author of the sketch himself allows them to be so, particularly those relating to the monarchy of Spain.



He quotes very emphatically the substance of the secret article; and far from finding fault with it, he reproaches the other states and princes of Europe for their indolence, in having so long forgotten the pretensions and views of France with respect to that monarchy.

HAD the events of the war, in consequence of this alliance, been so favourable to the arms of the confederates, as to have enabled them to conclude a peace upon an express condition of ascertaining and securing to the emperor the right of succeeding to the crown of Spain; and had that peace, according to an article in it, been guaranteed by a perpetual defensive alliance between the contracting parties, nobody would have thought the greatness of the house of Bourbon too much reduced, or that of Austria too much increased: such a peace would probably have settled the balance of power upon a lasting basis, and have prevented the ruinous and expensive wars in which all Europe was afterwards involved. The author of the sketch takes indeed several occasions, in order to justify his own scandalous peace of 1713, to affirm (with his usual air of authority, as if it must be so because he says it, scorning to give any proof for his bold assertions) that the union of the Imperial and Spanish crowns might be as dangerous, as the union of the two

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monarchies

monarchies of France and Spain, to the liberties of Europe: it must be owned, that the enterprising genius of CHARLES the Fifth, possessed of the Imperial and Spanish crowns, alarmed sometimes the neighbouring powers; but that terror was little more than a short and transitory flash: the extensive views and attempts of that active prince were often interrupted and checked by a variety of disagreeable events. Frequent disappointments at last subdued his ambitious spirit; he sunk on a sudden into retirement; he resigned his Imperial and royal crowns, dividing his dominions between his brother and son.

THE acquisitions of LEWIS the Fourteenth afterwards from the German Branch of the house of Austria, by the treaty of Munster, and from the Spanish branch, by that of the Pyrenees, and other usurpations and incroachments, even in time of peace, would have still made him, by reason of the largeness and contiguity of all his territories, more than a match for the emperor, had all the dominions of Spain, separated at such a distance from one another, and from those of Austria and the seat of empire, fallen to his Imperial majesty upon the death of King CHARLES the Second; for instead of becoming, by that accession, too powerful and formidable to his neighbours, he must still have depended upon the guaranties and assistance



assistance of England and Holland, to preserve his extensive dominions against the aspiring designs and attempts of LEWIS the Fourteenth: and if France would not, the emperor could not, have ventured to raise new disturbances, to promote ambitious views, with any hopes of success, as the rest of Europe might, and would certainly in that case, by a confederacy with the French, have opposed him with a strength much greater than what he could have exerted from such an union; of which more shall be said hereafter. But to return—

THE superiority and fortune of the French arms prevailed constantly against the allies; King WILLIAM, of glorious memory, made a noble stand; “he was,” as a \* French author says, “always beaten, but never defeated.” The many victories gained by France, the defection of the duke of SAVOY, the exhausted condition and uneasiness of the maritime powers, and particularly the party divisions and discontents in England, embarrassed and distressed him to such a degree, that he was necessitated to make the † peace of Ryswick; which, considering the

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\* Hénaut, Abregé Chronologique, anno 1702. Ses malheurs ne servirent qu'à faire voir les ressources de son génie, il fut toujours battu sans jamais avoir été défait.

† 1697.

great advantages obtained by France during the war, and her willingness to conclude it upon much the same terms with those of Nimeguen, may be said to have been an honourable one ; but it could by no means be a safe one, as long as the pretensions of that crown to the succession of the Spanish monarchy subsisted ; and the carrying those pretensions into execution by force, if not prevented by a treaty, could not be at a great distance, on account of the then languishing condition of the king of Spain.

THE improbability at that time of being able to get and keep, by a new war, from the house of Bourbon, that whole monarchy, made a composition necessary. The author of the sketch, after turning and twisting the question into a variety of shapes that are more amusing than instructive, as all his conceits and reflections are, confesses, \* that King WILLIAM could not do otherwise than come into a treaty of partition with France relating to the Spanish monarchy, to prevent a new war he was in no sort prepared to make.

IN regulating that partition care was taken by that wise prince, that the greatest part of those dominions, parti-



cularly those that might be most detrimental in the hands of France to the liberties of Europe, and to the security and commerce of the maritime powers, should not fall to any branch of the house of Bourbon. The disposition of Old Spain (except a small portion of it) and of the West Indies, as well as of the Low Countries, in favour of the Bavarian family, by the \* first treaty of partition, and by the † second, in favour of the arch-duke of Austria, would have made the contingency of uniting those rich and extensive dominions to the crown of France impossible, had either of those treaties taken place.

THIS composition was not, and indeed could not, be understood (as is insinuated by the author of the sketch) by the maritime powers as an acknowledgment of the right of France to any part of this succession; but it proceeded from a diffidence and distrust of their being able to collect a sufficient strength to wrest the whole Spanish monarchy out of her hands, and in order to prevent, if possible, her acquisition of Spain and the West Indies; the part which they apprehended would prove most

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\* Signed at the Hague, 11 Oct. 1698.

† Signed at London, 13 March 1700.

dangerous

dangerous to their barrier, and the navigation and trade of their subjects.

THIS composition, notwithstanding its securing such essential points, had it succeeded, was extremely censured at that time by this author and his malevolent party; but had the territories in Italy been assigned to the Emperor, and the rest of Spain, with the Low Countries and the West Indies, to the Dauphin, would not their clamour have been much louder, and with much more reason, for our having obtained for the house of Austria the Italian dominions? A portion which, in the division of the Spanish monarchy, might be more agreeable to her, but at the same time sacrificed and exposed the dominions of England and Holland, with their navigation and commerce, to the mercy of the house of Bourbon.

It must be agreed, that the territories allotted by the treaty of partition to the Dauphin, and consequently to France, would certainly have been a greater addition of strength and advantage to that crown, than was to have been wished, would the state of affairs in Europe have suffered a division to have been made less prejudicial to the public safety: but a division at that time was necessary; that which was made was better than none at all; better



better than abandoning without any concern the whole Spanish monarchy to the will of France ; and notwithstanding the ill effect and influence which a partition of those dominions might have, and it is natural to believe had, upon the councils of Spain in favour of France, which was undoubtedly foreseen, yet the circumstances of affairs made it the only resource to prevent a rupture ; and the result must have been, that if LEWIS the Fourteenth would have performed his engagements, the treaty must have succeeded, peace would have been preserved, and all possibility of an union of the two crowns of France and Spain been for ever barred ; but if the French king, in violation of them, should seize upon that monarchy, such a notorious breach of public faith, and evidence to all Europe of his intentions to subject their liberties to his arbitrary will, would have given England and Holland just cause and provocation to resent it ; and consequently have laid a foundation, as it did, to form more readily a confederacy with other powers against him, in their own defence, than possibly could have been effected time enough for their common security, had no such treaty been made.

THIS composition did not take place : LEWIS the Fourteenth, in violation of the most solemn engagements,  
according

according to custom, when he thought he had power to make his interest prevail against faith and right, adopted the will of CHARLES the Second, by which the duke of ANJOU was declared heir to the whole Spanish monarchy, with the most infamous excuse (as BURNET calls it) that although he had departed from the *terms* of the treaty, he had adhered to the *spirit* and intention of it; which was, to maintain the peace of Europe; as if fidelity to engagements between considerable powers was most likely to be the cause, and infidelity the prevention, of troubles. He soon after passed \* letters patent, reserving to the new king of Spain, and his heirs male, a right of succeeding to the crown of France, notwithstanding his accession to that of Spain.

THE duke of ANJOU, by the assistance of France, immediately took possession of the Spanish throne; the Dutch garisons of the barrier towns were surprized and dismissed, and French troops put in possession of them; and France by other violent steps, contrary to treaty, made herself mistress of the Netherlands. King WILLIAM and the States, unarmed and unprepared to re-

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\* Hénaut, *Abregé Chronologique*, anno 1700.



venge and resist such perfidious attempts, were obliged, in order to gain time, to acknowledge the duke of ANJOU king of Spain, and to enter into negotiations with the French minister at the Hague for the preservation of the peace, and for the security of their dominions and trade.

THE terms proposed by them were rejected with scorn; the continuation of hostilities on the part of France shewed plainly, that all was at stake; a rupture with that crown became unavoidable; for, as the author himself expresses it, \* “ The immediate securing of commerce and of barriers, the preventing an union of the two monarchies at some future time, and the preservation of a certain degree at least of equality in the scales of power, were points too important to England, Holland, and the rest of Europe, to be rested on the moderation of French and the vigour of Spanish councils, under a prince of the house of France.”

EUROPE was now in a great fermentation; various negotiations for concluding treaties, hiring troops, and warlike preparations, were carried on in several courts

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\* Page 39.

with much zeal; hostilities were begun in some parts; a general war ensued; and most of the princes and states in Europe were engaged on one side or the other.

MANY circumstances, besides the experience of former wars to her advantage, concurred to flatter France with a persuasion that her power was irresistible; united with Spain she had gained the king of Portugal, the dukes of Savoy and Mantua, and the electors of Bavaria and Cologne, to her interest; she had gotten possession by her fleets and arms of the whole Spanish monarchy; and, by seizing the Spanish Netherlands, had blocked-up and in a manner besieged the United Provinces.

IN this distracted and perilous state of affairs the Emperor, England, and Holland, concluded the \* second grand alliance, as absolutely necessary to make a stand for the preservation of their rights, dominions, and commerce, and the liberties of Europe.

THE motives of this treaty are founded upon the French king's having, immediately upon the death of King CHARLES the Second of Spain, † taken possession

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\* Sept. 7, 1701.

† Preamble.



of the whole monarchy of Spain for the duke of ANJOU, and seized by force the provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, the duchy of Milan, &c. by which and other means the kingdoms of France and Spain were so closely joined, that they must be considered for the future as one and the same kingdom. How to dissolve this fatal union, or obviate the mischievous consequences of it, the allies did not, and indeed could not, in such a dubious and frightful conjuncture, expressly stipulate by a particular plan; but they agreed in general and strong terms, that, \* in case of a war, none of the contracting parties should treat with the enemy but jointly with the participation and counsel of the others; and that no peace should be made without having obtained equitable and reasonable satisfaction for the Emperor; for the king of Great Britain and the States, a particular security of their respective dominions, navigation, and commerce; and without having previously taken just precautions, that the kingdoms of France and Spain might never be united under the same empire, nor one and the same king ever become sovereign of them both; particularly that the French might never get possession of the Spanish West Indies,

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\* Art. 8.

or carry on any trade thither, directly or indirectly, under any pretence whatsoever.

WHAT this equitable and reasonable satisfaction, this particular security, these just precautions, should be, and how the French should be prevented from getting the West Indies, and from trading thither, is not specified in the articles; in the mean time it is stipulated, \* that the utmost efforts should be made to recover the Spanish Low Countries, to conquer the duchy of Milan, Naples, and Sicily, the countries and islands in the Mediterranean upon the coast of Tuscany, that belong to the crown of Spain, to serve for the purposes therein mentioned.

AND it was agreed, † that the king of Great Britain and the States might by joint concert take and keep, for their own use and benefit of trade, any countries or towns possessed by the Spaniards in the West Indies.

THESE are the out-lines or a sketch of operations proposed by the allies, at the time of a general consternation, to encounter the formidable and united strength of France and Spain, until they should see the success of

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\* Art. 5.

† Art. 6.



their first efforts. For I must here observe to your Lordship, that the Imperial minister in negotiating the grand alliance was very earnest, that the restitution of the whole Spanish monarchy should be stipulated in his master's favour; the plenipotentiaries of England and Holland would not come into so extensive an engagement in express terms, not knowing what might be the fate of the war; but M. DICKVELT, a deputy from Utrecht of great repute, who managed this negotiation with the Imperial ministers, told them, the emperor might be assured, that, \* if the success of their arms should prove favourable, proper measures should be taken for the satisfaction of his Imperial majesty, which should be extended according to events: so that it is plain, that the efforts to be made for conquering certain countries and places were not understood to be sufficient, in all events, to answer the motives and conditions of the eighth article of the grand alliance, without which no peace was to be made with France and Spain; but what might be necessary to satisfy those great points was left undecided, and to be finally explained and settled, according to future

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\* Lamberti, vol. i. p. 620. Si le sort des armes venoit à être favorable, l'on prendroit des mesures convenables pour la satisfaction de sa majesté Imperiale, & l'on s'étendrait suivant les événements.

circumstances and successes in the course of the war. And your Lordship will observe, that England and Holland, by the sixth article, might take and keep, for their own benefit of trade, any place or part belonging to Spain in the West Indies: a plain evidence that they never intended PHILIP should remain possessed of the Spanish West Indies, if they could by any means prevent it.

THE death of King WILLIAM at this critical and interesting juncture occasioned a great consternation, not only in Great Britain, but also abroad amongst all the potentates that were concerned for the liberties of Europe.

THAT noble minded prince having felt himself some time to be in a declining state of health, and foreseeing into whose hands the administration of affairs in England would fall upon his death, gave up his personal resentment against Lord MARLBOROUGH to the public good, in order to have the common cause supported against France; and, before he died, appointed that lord his ambassador to the States, and commander in chief of the English forces in Holland.

QUEEN ANNE, upon her accession to the throne, immediately sent his Lordship to give the States the strongest assurances



assurances of her resolution to maintain the alliances that had been made, and to concur with them in every thing that the common interest of Europe should require.

IN the mean time France, by corruption and intrigues in foreign courts, and by early and vigorous measures in the field, gained daily new strength and advantages, before the maritime powers, by the nature of their government, could put themselves in a condition to act; and the affairs of the allies had, on the entrance into the war, a very dark and unpromising aspect. Contrary to all human appearances, the military operations soon took an extraordinary turn in their favour.

THE enterprising and intrepid genius of Prince EUGENE was attended with wonderful success in Italy.

THE incomparable conduct and courage of Lord MARLBOROUGH, by taking in a short time several towns in the Low Countries, and obliging the enemy, advanced as far as under the walls of Nimeguen, to retire precipitately before him, released the United Provinces, who had been encompassed by the French forces, and new-erected forts, from their imprisonment; and from that despondency into which the vast superiority and progress  
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of the French on all sides had flung them at the beginning of the troubles.

BUT a stroke of the greatest policy and importance to the common cause was, the success of the negotiations with Portugal and Savoy.

THOSE two powers, by offensive and defensive alliances contracted the second year of the war with the Emperor, Great Britain, and the States, were \* detached from their former engagements with France and Spain, and heartily engaged in support of the public interest of Europe.

By the † treaty with Portugal it is agreed, that the three confederate powers, together with his Portuguese majesty, shall unanimously endeavour, that the Archduke CHARLES may be put into possession of all Spain, as it was enjoyed by the catholic king, CHARLES the Second, Art. 1. And no peace or truce shall be made without the mutual consent of all the contracting parties, nor at any time, *as long as the second grandson of the most christian king, or any other prince of the French race, should continue in Spain.* Art. 21.

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\* 1703.

† May 16, 1703.



THE Arch-duke CHARLES shall come into Portugal, and land there with the auxiliary forces of the confederate powers. Art. 24.

As soon as he arrives in Portugal, that king shall acknowledge him and hold him for king of Spain, as King CHARLES the Second possessed it. Art. 25.

THAT the confederates shall carry on the war briskly in the Low Countries, on the Rhine, and in Italy, at the same time as they enter into Spain on the side of Portugal. Art. 27.

THAT the arch-duke, when king of Spain, shall yield to the king of Portugal Badajos, Albuquerque, Valencia, and Alcantara in Estramadura, &c. Secret Art. 1.

THE arch-duke is likewise to yield up to his Portugal majesty certain dominions adjoining to the river Plata in America. Secret Art. 2.

By that with Savoy, that prince's right of succession to the Spanish monarchy, preferably to any other prince after the house of Austria, according to the will of PHILIP the Fourth, is asserted and preserved to him in the

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most

most exprefs terms ; and in confideration of the danger to which he expofes his dominions and his perfon, feveral places and provinces in Italy are to be yielded to him.

So that your Lordship will obferve, that the recognition of the arch-duke as king of Spain, a joint exertion of the utmoft efforts on the part of the allies to put him in poffeffion of that crown, and a perpetual exclusion of every branch of the houfe of Bourbon, were the motives and objects of thefe treaties.

UPON the whole it is evident, that all the engagements which the maritime powers contracted, relative to the monarchy of Spain, from the firft grand alliance in 1689 to the conclufion of the treaties with Portugal and Savoy in 1703, although conceived in different terms, more or lefs explicit and extenfive, according to the different circumftances and fituation of affairs at the time of making them, when confidered and compared together, can be underftood to have no other meaning and view, than that of preventing Spain and the Weft Indies from being poffeffed by any prince of the houfe of France, if the confederates againft that crown fhould find themfelves in a condition, by the fuccefs of their arms, to obtain that great and falutary end.

L E T T E R



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L E T T E R    I V.

I AM now to take a general view of the operations of the war, and the consequences of them in the several parts of Europe; from 1703 to the end of 1706.

IN pursuance of the engagements contracted by the treaties with Portugal and Savoy, the utmost efforts were made on the part of the allies to carry them into execution.

THE emperor and the king of the Romans resigned to the arch-duke of Austria their pretensions to the Spanish monarchy.

THAT prince was \* declared king of Spain; he left Vienna as soon as the formal punctilios of that court would allow; came to the Hague, and from Holland embarked for England, and sailed from hence with all

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\* 1703.

expedition

expedition on board the fleet that escorted a considerable body of forces to Lisbon; where he was acknowledged and received in a manner suitable to his dignity: \* preparations were made to penetrate into Spain on that side with a confederate army under the command of Lord GALWAY.

THE fortress and port of Gibraltar, of the greatest consequence in a war with Spain, commanding the mouth of the Straights, by land deemed impregnable, as defended by steep rocks, and on the sea side inaccessible to great ships from the nature of the bay, was surprized and taken by the brave Prince of HESSE DARMSTADT.

† THE combined fleet of England and Holland met and engaged that of France in the Mediterranean; the battle was not decisive, but the royal navy of France was so disabled, that it never appeared again at sea during that war.

THE French and Spaniards were disappointed in their rash attempt to retake Gibraltar for PHILIP; their army was obliged to ‡ raise the siege, and the French squadron

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\* 1704.

† 1704.

‡ 1705.

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that blocked-up the port, was either dispersed by storms, or destroyed by an English one.

THE military operations on the frontiers of Portugal and Spain proved of no great consequence on either side, for two campaigns after the arrival of King CHARLES at Lisbon. Disgusted at such dilatory proceedings, and weary of his fruitless stay there, he received undoubted intelligence of a general disposition in Catalonia, and, in some parts, of insurrections in his favour : he determined to embark on board a fleet arrived about that time at Lisbon with five thousand men from England ; he landed with these troops near Barcelona ; and with a firmness that surpassed all rules of military prudence, considering the strength of the garison and the situation of the place, he persevered in the resolution to sit down before Monjuy ; that fort was attacked, and miraculously taken ; Barcelona soon after surrendered, where he was received and acknowledged king of Spain with one general voice. This unexpected success disposed that whole principality to declare openly for him with great zeal and activity.

A DETACHMENT of troops was sent from Barcelona to Valencia, to promote and strengthen a revolt there ; and although ill equipped and ill furnished, without artillery

tillery and with very little ammunition, yet, as they marched, all the country either came in to them, or fled before them: they entered that capital without opposition, and were received with all possible demonstration of loyalty and affection to King CHARLES; in six weeks time he was master of the kingdom of Valencia and the principality of Catalonia.

PHILIP, with a well appointed army, commanded by Marshal TESSE, \* attempted to retake Barcelona. Count TOULOUSE lay before the port with a squadron of ships. King CHARLES, with an heroic steadiness of mind, staid in the town; animated with his presence the people in the greatest danger and under the greatest consternation; and gave time for the seasonable arrival of our fleet with succours: the enemy raised the siege with great precipitation and disorder; left their camp well furnished; nor could their sick and wounded be carried off: their army was so harassed by Catalan Miquelets as they retired, and so fatigued with forced marches, that it got to the frontiers of France in a very weak and shattered condition.

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\* 1706.



THE magnanimous behaviour of King CHARLES in such trying conjunctures, supported with such fortunate events, greatly extended and increased his credit and power in Spain; the kingdom of Arragon was encouraged to follow their own inclinations, and the examples of Catalonia and Valencia, by a hearty recognition of him.

IN the mean time Lord GALWAY, with an army of twenty thousand men, had opened the campaign on the side of Portugal, taking in his march the most considerable places with little or no resistance: he advanced without opposition to Madrid, where King CHARLES was proclaimed; the duke of BERWICK was in no condition to oppose him; and PHILIP, lately arrived there with a small train, was forced to abandon the metropolis of Castile.

THE unaccountable delay of King CHARLES to march thither immediately after raising the siege of Barcelona, gave PHILIP time to gather his scattered forces together, and, by an increase of troops from France, to get an army equal to Lord GALWAY's; that general was then obliged to quit Madrid to cover King CHARLES's march to Saragossa: PHILIP took heart and recovered the capital;

pital; but his rival continued still master of the kingdoms of Arragon, Valencia, and the principality of Catalonia.

THIS was the situation of affairs in Spain at the end of the year 1706.

\* IN the Low Countries nothing could withstand the Duke of MARLBOROUGH's conduct and fortune: he took Bonne, the residence of the elector of Cologne, who had engaged with his brother of Bavaria on the part of France; he made himself master of Huy and Limbourg and Geldre; by which the Lower Rhine and the Dutch frontier was secured.

NOTHING of moment was done on either side the next campaign in Flanders.

IN Germany, the successful co-operations of the Bavarian forces with those of France, and the weak management and measures of the Imperial councils and generals there, had reduced the emperor's affairs to the last extremity: the elector of Bavaria was master of the Danube



all down to Passau; excursions and devastations by his parties were carried beyond that river, even into Austria, at the same time the male-contents in Hungary were making a formidable progress; the way to Vienna was open, and that city exposed to a siege: it was deliberated in the emperor's council, whether he should not leave his capital. In short, the house of Austria must have been undone, had not the Duke of MARLBOROUGH hastened to her relief.

\* THE plan of so great an enterprize was concerted and carried on by his Grace and Prince EUGENE with the utmost secrecy and expedition: the march of our army from the Rhine to the Danube surprized all Europe, particularly France and the elector of Bavaria; it proved as fortunate and glorious, as it was bold and unexpected; the elector's army entrenched in a strong pass near Donawert, to stop the Duke of MARLBOROUGH's progress, was attacked, and defended itself with great bravery; the action was warm, the loss on both sides near equal, but at last the enemies were intirely routed. This success gave his Grace a passage over the Danube, and an opportunity to join Prince EUGENE, with the Germans

under his command; the elector of Bavaria joined at the same time Marshal TALLARD and his forces: their army advanced near ours, and was advantageously posted; the famous battle of Hochstedt ensued; we gained a complete victory; on our side about twelve thousand men were killed and wounded; but the enemy lost about forty thousand, killed, wounded, and taken.

THE French army of sixty thousand men, that had been so long victorious in Germany, was intirely ruined; scarce twenty thousand effective men could be gotten together. In less than a month's time a hundred leagues of country was conquered, with all Bavaria, which was plundered and laid waste. The elector fled for Brussels, and meeting his brother the elector of Cologne in his way, who had likewise been driven from his dominions, they embraced one another with tears. The court of Versailles, accustomed to prosperity, was in the greatest consternation; nobody but Madam MAINTENON would venture to tell LEWIS the Fourteenth that he was not invincible.

THE Duke of MARLBOROUGH designed to make the Moselle \* this year the seat of action: he had concerted a



scheme with Prince LEWIS of Baden to attack Villars near Triers, but was disappointed in the execution of it, that prince having shamefully failed in his assurances to join him with his forces.

THE Duke returned to the Low Countries time enough to raise the siege of the citadel of Liege, and retook Huy, which had been taken in his absence; he then attacked the French army deeply entrenched, and broke through their lines; they retired to a strong camp: his Grace proposed twice to attempt the forcing of it; but the Dutch deputies, by the advice of their generals, thought it too desperate an undertaking; so that this campaign ended in Germany and Flanders, without any other effect than that of shewing the Duke's indefatigable activity and desire to fall upon the French in all places, and on all occasions.

LEWIS the Fourteenth expecting (though he was disappointed in his expectations) that the Danes and Prussians would not join the confederate forces time enough at the opening of this \* campaign in Flanders, ordered the elector of Bavaria and VILLEROY to venture a battle;

they advanced towards the Duke of MARLBOROUGH, who was marching up to them with the same design: the armies met at a village called Ramillies; it was an intire engagement; the French in a short time gave way every where, were totally defeated, and fled in the greatest confusion. The Duke of MARLBOROUGH, after the pursuit, lost no time in making the best advantage of this signal victory; he reduced with an incredible rapidity all Spanish Flanders; the enemy was seized with a panic and dread of that invincible hero, from which they never recovered during the rest of the war.

THE operations in Italy, notwithstanding the great preparations and sanguine hopes of France, proved as unfortunate this \* campaign to the house of Bourbon, as they had done in other parts.

LEWIS the Fourteenth had discovered the Duke of SAVOY's secret negotiations with the allies in 1703; big with revenge, and sensible of the dangerous consequences of such a defection, if not timely prevented, he thought he had taken infallible measures to ruin him intirely, before he could receive any relief from the allies. The



Duke of VENDOSME arrested and disarmed his Royal Highness's troops under his command, penetrated into his country, and pushed-on the conquest of it with the utmost vigour: the military skill of STAHRMBERG, by an extraordinary march, supplied his Royal Highness with a few troops; Prince EUGENE, by disputing passes with his usual undaunted bravery, gave some check to the progress of the French; but not receiving in time from the emperor and empire the promised succours, the superiority of the French became irresistible. The Duke of SAVOY supported his desperate condition with great conduct, and shewed an incredible firmness in his misfortunes: all possible methods were used to induce him to abandon the allies; the government of the Milanese for his life, and several millions of livres for repairing the works of his places that were demolished, were offered. He rejected these proposals, and declared his resolution to adhere steadily to the grand alliance. By his vigilance and activity the sieges of his strong towns were rendered a tedious work, and cost the French dear: he lost at last all of them, except Turin; that capital was invested and attacked by a numerous army, furnished with an immense quantity of artillery and ammunition; being well fortified and provided in every respect, it made a noble defence: his Royal Highness quitted the town with some  
troops

troops of horse, and was hunted from valley to valley by the French generals : reduced within a small compass of territory, he managed his little army with great art and resolution; and knowing the country, he baffled and escaped the pursuit of his enemy, until Prince EUGENE, having received a considerable reinforcement of men and money, was enabled to advance forward, and with great presence of mind, by sudden attacks or unexpected marches, beat or deceived the enemy's forces posted in his way; and breaking through all opposition, gave the Duke of SAVOY an opportunity to join him with the remains of his army. These two brave generals being joined, attacked and intirely routed the French in their entrenchments before Turin, and obliged them to raise the siege of that place in great disorder : this overthrow cost the house of Bourbon the Milanese, the Mantuan, Piedmont, and at last the kingdom of Naples. Such a series of surprizing victories and conquests in all parts of Europe, had reduced the affairs of the two crowns to the utmost distress : the histories of those times, English and French, take particular notice of this memorable period. The French (says a \* great English author) had so well laid the design of their campaign in 1706, that it had a for-

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\* Barnet.



midable appearance ; and if the execution had answered their scheme, it must have proved as glorious, as it was in the conclusion fatal to them. After the siege of Turin was raised, the same author observes, that such a succession of signal misfortunes in one campaign, and in so many different parts, was without example ; it made all people conclude, that the time was now come, in which the perfidy, tyranny, and cruelty of the French king's long and bloody reign was to be repaid him in the same manner he had treated others.

\* A FRENCH author expresses the misfortunes of this year to France more emphatically in a few words, than can well be done in English, " Cette année mit le comble  
" aux revers de la France."

UPON the whole, by the success that attended the arms of the confederates from 1703 to 1706, the emperor and the empire were saved from ruin ; the vast extent of country from the Danube to the Rhine was subdued, and the electors of Bavaria and Cologne lost their dominions.

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\* Hénaut.

ALL Spanish Flanders and Brabant were taken, and a way opened for pushing on our conquests (as was done afterwards) to the frontiers of Old France; which might have been carried even to Paris, had it not been prevented by the removal of the Duke of MARLBOROUGH and an ignominious peace.

THE Spaniards and French were driven out of Italy; King CHARLES was master of the kingdoms of Arragon, Valencia, and the principality of Catalonia; and \* it is said, PHILIP was reduced to such streights, that the famous engineer VAUBAN proposed to the court of France to send him, with the Spaniards attached to his interests, to reign in America. However chimerical this notion may seem to be, it shews, that the supporting him on the throne of Spain was looked upon by the French themselves as chimerical at that time.

I SHALL conclude this letter with one observation, which must have occurred to your Lordship in reading the foregoing deduction; which is, that a situation of affairs so glorious to the allies, and so disadvantageous to

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\* Voltaire.



the enemy, at the conclusion of the campaign in 1706, was the result of the measures pursued in consequence of the alliances made with the king of Portugal and the Duke of SAVOY. \* A French author speaking of that with the latter says, That the defection of the Duke of SAVOY was one of the principal causes of all the misfortunes of the war.

THIS distressed condition of the house of Bourbon's affairs raised the expectations of all Europe, that LEWIS the Fourteenth, overwhelmed with calamities on every side, and in compassion to the miseries of his people, would have been induced to propose the cession of Spain and the West Indies to the house of Austria, as a preliminary condition for entering into a treaty to put an end to so ruinous a war. The engagements which the allies had reciprocally contracted, were founded upon this principle; their extensive and expensive efforts were exerted with this view; and the extraordinary success of

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\* Hénaut, Abregé Chronologique, anno 1703. Le Duc de Savoye conclut une ligue avec l'Empereur; cette defection fut une des principales causes de tous les malheurs de cette guerre.

their arms gave them just and reasonable grounds to expect and insist upon the accomplishment of it: but whether the French took any steps of that kind, must be the subject of another letter.

LETTER



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LETTER V.

I AM now to confider what motions were made towards a peace, from 1703 to the end of 1706.

THERE appear no traces of any intimation of this nature on the part of France until 1705.

INSINUATIONS were then made, first by the Marquis d'ALEGRE, a French prisoner, then at the Hague; and afterwards by one HELVETIUS, and some other French emissaries among the people in Holland; that LEWIS the Fourteenth, sensible of his great losses, and of his inability to resist any longer the power of the confederates, was seriously inclined to put an end to the war: propositions that pointed at a partition treaty were privately suggested to the pensionary of Holland, and laid before the States; but conceived in terms so loose and vague, without any authority, as shewed plainly, they were only calculated to create jealousy and diffidence among the allies. Artful surmises of a secret negociation

alarmed the foreign ministers at the Hague; to prevent the ill effects of them, the French emissaries were sent out of the country; but given to understand at the same time, that if France desired a general peace, she should make proposals for the security of Europe of conditions so clear, and without equivocation, as might be a sufficient ground for deliberation, by a joint concert with all the allies \*.

AFTER the battle of Ramillies, the elector of Bavaria, by † letters to the Duke of MARLBOROUGH and the Deputies of the States, let them know, that his most Christian majesty, finding that some overtures he had made for a peace by private ways had been misrepresented, to shew the sincerity of his intentions to establish the tranquillity of Europe, would consent that a place should be immediately chosen, between the two armies; and after their separation, between Mons and Brussels; where his Grace on the part of England, deputies named by the States, and persons appointed by his most Christian majesty, might begin to negotiate a matter of so much importance.

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\* Lamberti, tom. ili. anno 1705, p. 550, 1, 2, 3.

† Oct. 21, 1706, N. S.



THE Elector in these letters allowed, that there was no intention to exclude any other powers out of this negociation: \* the Duke of MARLBOROUGH and † the Deputies, in answer to the Elector's letters, expressed the satisfaction of her Majesty and the States in the French king's inclinations to conclude a solid and lasting peace, and declared their readiness to enter, jointly with all their allies, into just and necessary measures for concluding such a peace; but the way proposed by conferences, without more particular explanations of his most Christian majesty's intentions, did not seem to them at all proper to obtain a lasting one; and therefore more solid means must be thought of for attaining that great end, in which her Majesty and the States would most readily concur, their sincere inclinations for peace being well known, and that they had nothing so much at heart as the ease of their people and the tranquillity of Europe.

THIS whole transaction was communicated to the rest of the allies; to remove on one side the jealousy which some of them had entertained of a secret negociation without their participation; and to obviate on the other

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\* Nov. 19, 1706.

† Nov. 20, 1706.

the ill impression the French emissaries endeavoured to make upon the minds of the people of England and Holland, as if their ministers were not disposed to hearken to a reasonable accommodation. This is the substance of these pacific letters.

YOUR Lordship will observe, that this application on the part of France, by an elector engaged in her interest, neither specifies nor refers to any proposal or condition, that might serve as a foundation to meet and treat of peace. It is indeed true, that the \* bishop of Chichester, in his account of the management of the war, takes notice of letters written to the maritime powers by the Elector of Bavaria, who was employed by the French king to make the first overture, which were immediately communicated to the allies; and adds—"Whoever  
 " will be at the pains to look back to the news-papers  
 " and monthly accounts of that time, will see, there is  
 " no mystery in the whole affair; being no more than  
 " that the French offered to give up to the allies which  
 " of these two they liked best, either Spain and the Indies, or Milan, Naples, and Sicily; and this offer was

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\* See his Works, vol. iii. p. 7, 8, &c.

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“ unanimously rejected.” An insinuation of such a partition, together with a good barrier in the Low Countries, and the tariff of 1664, was said to have been made underhand from France by emissaries or persons of no weight or authority; and consequently no attention given to it. But the bishop must have been mistaken; if he means, that this offer accompanied the letters written by the Elector of Bavaria to the Duke of MARLBOROUGH and the Deputies, the contents of them and the answer to them shew the contrary: no terms for peace were mentioned; and nothing more than the appointment of a place for conferences; however, that is of no consequence. He allows, that such an offer was made by France, and rejected by the allies; and shews by unanswerable reasons, why the maritime powers ought not to accept either part of the alternative, as nothing was meant by it, but to amuse and divide the allies: his arguments are cogent, and indeed irresistible; but as they are long, and my business is with the author of the sketch, I must beg leave to refer your Lordship to the work itself, taking only notice, which is sufficient to shew the insincerity of France, that it appears by a letter which LEWIS the Fourteenth \* wrote to the Pope, not

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\* Feb. 15, 1706-7.

many months after these written by the Elector of Bavaria (and which the bishop quotes) that France never intended to let the allies have the choice of the alternative; of which I shall have occasion to speak more largely hereafter, as it was the only scheme tending towards a pacification, that appears, as far as I can discover, to have been suggested by any authority on the part of France, from the beginning of the war to this time.

AND although the author of the sketch himself roundly, but falsely, affirms that France offered in 1706 to make a peace upon the principles of the grand alliance of 1701, he no where so much as insinuates, that the cession of Spain and the West Indies to the house of Austria was part of that offer.

HAVING thus plainly laid before your Lordship, without art or fallacy, the motives that induced England and Holland to enter, jointly with other powers, into alliances and expensive wars against the house of Bourbon, to prevent Spain and the West Indies from being ever possessed by any branch of that family; the engagements of those alliances, as they were contracted from time to time according to the circumstances of affairs and the course of events; the hopeful prospect of obtaining that  
great



great end, by the glorious and successful efforts of their arms in all parts of Europe in 1706; you cannot, I am persuaded, read without astonishment the false and confident assertions advanced by the author of the sketch on this subject.

\* He takes upon him to affirm, that France, confessing at last her inability to support what she had undertaken, sued for peace as early as the year 1706, and was ready to conclude it with the allies, † on the principles of the grand alliance of 1701. He asserts, that this offer on the part of France was rejected by the allies, for reasons of ‡ ambition, avarice, and the private interest of particular persons and particular states; || partly known, and (ridiculous insolence!) partly guessed at; from which refusal of an ample satisfaction now tendered them, he infers their departure from the original plan; and upon that account pronounces the war to have been from this time § unwise and unjust.

It appears in great measure, from a bare inspection of the articles of the grand alliance in 1701, that those and

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\* Page 63.

† P. 64.

‡ P. 68.

|| P. 87, 88.

§ P. 67, 68, 70.

the many other dogmatical assertions scattered through this famous work, have no foundation in reason and truth; it appears, that the offers pretended (and only pretended) to have been made by France in 1706, were however by no means satisfactory on the principles of that alliance; that the allies are therefore falsely and unjustly charged with rejecting what was never offered; scandalous motives assigned for their actual choice, in a case where they never had any option; and their wisdom and justice arraigned for changing a plan, which was indeed never changed, but was uniformly pursued upon principles agreeable to the express terms and views of the first grand alliance, the partition treaties, and those afterwards contracted with Portugal and Savoy; and which were, and must have always been, uppermost in their thoughts and intentions, because the same motives of mutual interest and safety always subsisted, although the obtaining the end depended upon the success of the measures taken to enable them to do it; and suppose the plan might properly be said to be changed, the allies were even in that case answerable only to each other for whatever alteration should be made in it; for the grand alliance of 1701 was no engagement between them and France, but between themselves against the formidable power and perfidious conduct of France. With respect to whom then could a supposed  
alteration



alteration of the plan be said to make the war unjust? It is plain, it could not be with respect to France; nor could it be so with respect to the allies themselves, as they had all agreed to it; and continuing the war must have been a wise measure, if the plan could be carried into execution; it having been the declared sense and desire of all the powers of Europe for so many years, except one family, as necessary for the preservation of their liberties; nay, the \* author himself owns, that the setting an Austrian prince upon the throne of Spain was, no doubt, the best expedient to prevent an union of the two monarchies of France and Spain; † that it was certainly most eligible, were it but practicable.

If therefore, as by what has been already plainly shewn, and will hereafter more fully appear, this new plan, as he calls it, was become practicable, by his own way of reasoning, it was likewise become eligible; especially as it was (the best, he grants, but in truth) the only effectual expedient for preventing for ever that possible union: his bold affirmation of the contrary, as he has produced no other so effectual, is vain and insignifi-

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\* Page 74.

† P. 78.

cant. Were not all this so, my Lord, why should the author have declined the little trouble it would have cost him to state the express terms of the grand alliance, and at the same time the express terms of peace offered by France in 1706? that by comparing them together it might be seen, how far the last were agreeable to the views, and would have answered the intentions of the first: whether the allies, by making the conquest of the Spanish monarchy the object of the war, had \* departed from the principles of the grand alliance, and made a new plan; and in what the great change made by this new plan consisted. Why, instead of this, does he impose it upon the noble person to peruse the anecdotes of the times, and consider the events of the war ensuing the death of the king of Spain, without any intimation what anecdotes and events he particularly means?—Why, but that his suggestions being all fictitious, were not to be brought to the touchstone of truth; and that to have furnished his Lordship with the proper means of forming a true judgment on the whole, must have had an effect directly contrary to what this author would intimate!

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\* Page 65.



It being utterly inconvenient that his Lordship's, or any reader's attention, should dwell upon the scheme itself of the grand alliance, and at the same time, from the frequent mention necessary to be made of the principles of that alliance, impossible to avoid appealing to it, his management upon the occasion is pleasant enough: he states in general terms the principal conditions of that treaty; he then, by a forced and false inference, substitutes, as the end proposed by the allies, what never was intended for such; and this creature of his brain he from thenceforth calls the object of the war, and reasons upon it, as if it were unquestionably so. For example; the engagements of the grand alliance (as \* stated by himself) were—To procure a reasonable satisfaction to his Imperial majesty for his pretensions to the Spanish monarchy, and a sufficient security to the king of England and the States General for their dominions, and for the navigation and commerce of their subjects; and to prevent the union of the two monarchies of France and Spain. He industriously omits what is mentioned in the sixth article of that alliance concerning the Spanish West Indies.

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\* Page 45, 46.

It must be a wonderful sagacity and penetration, that can find in this what \* he pretends is implied in it; viz. That the object of the war was a partition, by which a prince of the house of Bourbon was to be left on the throne of Spain: upon which however, taken for granted, he concludes, that the peace offered by France in 1706 was agreeable to the principles of the grand alliance. Manifestly false and groundless all; for is there any thing like a partition pointed at in the alliance? Is it there specified what should be given the emperor as a reasonable satisfaction for his pretensions to the Spanish monarchy? What security given to England and the States for their dominions, navigation, and commerce? What measures taken to prevent for ever an union of the monarchy of France and Spain? The intention of the maritime powers to make conquests in the Spanish West Indies is plainly pointed at by that treaty, of which he takes no notice; but the other great points not being explained therein, are left, as I said before, to be regulated by future circumstances, according to the success of the war, and do not surely fall under his arbitrary determination; to which they must yet be subjected, before he is qualified



to prescribe what offers from France shall amount to the satisfaction required by the allies. He does not indeed attempt to shew, that any such offers were made by her in 1706, as could fairly be deemed acceptable; if there had, he must have been able to produce them: he was in that year secretary at war; and Mr. HARLEY, his then intimate friend and confident, was secretary of state, and all the transactions with France were in his department. Our author might therefore have exhibited the specific offers to the public; and, not to interrupt the smoothness of his miscellaneous essay, he might have added them by way of appendix, and have told us, when and by whom those honourable offers were made on the part of France, and what passed upon them; unless the known integrity of his uniform conduct for so many years since ought to make us conclude, that he had a scruple of conscience to disclose secrets of state with which he had been intrusted, at whatever distance of time. He could not, it seems, in forty years, find in his heart to lay open certain secret motives, designs, and intrigues, which (with a pious vehemence \* he assures us) would make appear the most confused scene of iniquity and folly possible to be imagined. Thus the poor

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\* Page 88.

gentleman was forced to content himself with abusing England, her allies, and their ministers, in general terms of scurrility, and without any proof at all; as if France was the only honest, just, and reasonable power concerned, without any particular view, for the prosperity and peace of the public, and he and his cabal the only ministers in Europe, besides those of France, free from ambition, avarice, and private interest. The faint shadow of proof he sometimes offers, is indeed worse than none: let us take for a specimen his main position, laid down with great confidence, for weak as he is in proof, he is strong enough in assertion; viz. \* “ That all the  
 “ ends of the grand alliance might have been obtained  
 “ by a peace in 1706.” How does he prove this assertion? Why, “ The Low Countries (he says) were conquered; the French driven out of Germany and Italy;  
 “ LEWIS the Fourteenth was reduced to sue for peace:  
 “ if it had been granted, upon what foot could it have  
 “ been granted? The allies had already in their power  
 “ all the states that were to compose a reasonable satisfaction for the emperor; because, though Naples and  
 “ Sicily were not actually reduced, yet the allies might  
 “ reduce them when they pleased †.”—And this must

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\* Page 79.

† P. 80.

suffice,



suffice, for it is all he has to support his bold affirmation.

BUT it is the misfortune of this argument to be miserably scanty and lame; it extends to no more than one of the several ends of the grand alliance, and by no means answers that.

FOR the satisfaction intended to the emperor being nowhere defined, by what authority (I say again) does he pronounce, that what the French had lost in Germany, and might easily be taken from them in Italy, was a just and reasonable compensation for his Imperial majesty's pretensions to the Spanish monarchy? The emperor could not be supposed to consider it as such: his plenipotentiaries, in negotiating the alliance, strenuously insisted upon an article for the restitution of the whole Spanish monarchy; and not having obtained it in positive terms, had taken care that his satisfaction should be expressed in general ones; subject to a future regulation, according to circumstances and contingencies; particularly, that no peace should be concluded, unless measures were previously taken for ever to prevent an union of the crowns of France and Spain; imagining, not without reason, that such an union could not be for ever prevented, if a

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branch of the house of Bourbon should remain upon the throne of Spain.

BUT supposing that the countries and places he mentions might be considered as a full satisfaction to the Emperor's pretensions, what was to have been the particular security to the dominions of Great Britain and the States General in 1706? I imagine he would say, the Low Countries that had been conquered by the allies. Now were Tournay, Mons, or Lisle then taken? or were they offered to be surrendered by France in 1706? The two first, I suppose, the author himself did not think would have been more than necessary, with the towns already conquered, for the Dutch barrier, whatever he might think of Lisle, which was taken afterwards; and that important fortress (I cannot but remember it) of the utmost consequence to the barrier, and on account of its woollen manufactures of the greatest detriment to the trade of England, if possessed by France, was shamefully restored by the author to that crown, as part of an equivalent for the imperfect demolition of Dunkirk, at a time when the allies might have penetrated into France, had not the ignominious defection of the British troops, by his direction, disappointed that design, when ready to be executed.

BUT,



BUT, supposing farther, the Low Countries that were then in the possession of the confederates might be a security to the dominions of the States, and consequently to England, in the sense of the grand alliance; I return to the same question, what was the particular security offered by France for the navigation and commerce of the maritime powers in 1706? Or what measures were then proposed to be previously taken to prevent a possibility of an union, at any time, of the kingdoms of France and Spain? it being, as I said before, expressly stipulated, that no peace should be made, until these essential points should be settled. These, it seems, were trifles with our author, and unworthy of his consideration: \* he owns, that the engagements contained in the grand alliance were founded in good policy; and that the procuring a sufficient security to the maritime powers, not only for their dominions, but for their navigation and commerce, and to prevent for ever the union of France and Spain, were part of those engagements: yet he no where so much as hints, that this security was offered by France, when, he pretends, she sued for a peace in 1706.

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\* Page 45, 46.

SUCH is the proof produced by him of his bold \* assertion, that France was then ready to conclude a peace with the allies upon the principles of the grand alliance: he presents us with his partial and arbitrary decision of the interests of one of the parties in it, and that is all: of securing the navigation and commerce of Great Britain and the States, or of preventing an union of the two crowns (though essential points, and laid down in that treaty as necessary conditions of peace) he says nothing, makes not the least attempt to shew they were at all provided for, in any offers from France at that time, or any thing tending that way so much as insinuated.

It will perhaps the less be wondered at, that he was indifferent about these points, if it be considered, that when he himself took the lead in the management of foreign affairs, strengthened with the superiority and influence which the wonderful success of the confederate arms, and the desperate state of humbled France, afforded him; instead of taking care to improve the commercial interest of his own country, or even to put it on so good a foot as it was before the war; such was his ig-



norance or iniquity, or it may be both, that by the treaty of commerce made with France for Great Britain (had the Parliament approved of some of the articles, which was necessary before it could take place) the most beneficial branches of the general trade of this nation to most parts of Europe must have been lost; and with regard to Spain (although PHILIP was suffered, purely, I may say, by the good will and indulgence of a British queen, to remain upon that throne) the antient and advantageous privileges of trade, which Great Britain had so long enjoyed, were intirely, by the treaty of commerce with that crown, explained away and abolished (as shall be fully made appear hereafter): and the author himself had the principal direction and conduct of that work.

THE point remaining to be considered, is the effectual prevention of an union of the monarchies of France and Spain, which was itself by the grand alliance a condition sine quâ non for making peace, though every other condition had been settled in the offers of 1706.

THE author does not so much as glance at any overture made by France upon this head; but betakes himself to his spurious object of the war, which he will  
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needs have to be “ \* a partition, by which a prince of  
 “ the house of Bourbon (acknowledged by us as king of  
 “ Spain) was to be left on the throne of that dismem-  
 “ bered monarchy ;” taking for granted withal, that the  
 Spanish West Indies (although it is plainly otherwise  
 meant by an article of the grand alliance) were to be  
 left in the possession of PHILIP.

AND to the same effect in another place, † he speaks  
 of a “ groundless notion prevailing, that no effectual mea-  
 “ sure could be taken, altho’ the grand alliance supposed  
 “ that there might, to prevent the future union of the  
 “ two monarchies, as long as a prince of the house of  
 “ Bourbon sat upon the Spanish throne.” Now which  
 way is it necessary to suppose, that by the grand alliance  
 a prince of Bourbon was to be left on the throne of  
 Spain ? And how is it concluded from that alliance, that  
 an effectual provision against the union of the two mon-  
 archies might be made, notwithstanding his being left  
 in that possession ? What was expressly stipulated was only  
 to procure a real prevention of that union : this must be  
 considered as the great intention of the alliance, and was  
 properly the object of the war ; and PHILIP’s being left

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\* Page 46.

† P. 71.



or not left upon the throne of Spain, must naturally depend on the opinion of the allies, how far that would be consistent with and productive of their main design; nor can it avail any thing, what he would slyly insinuate of PHILIP's having been acknowledged by us as king of Spain.

It is indeed true, that both England and Holland (under the greatest consternation when the French had surprized and seized the Low Countries, and got possession of the whole Spanish monarchy) acknowledged him in that quality before the making of that treaty, and before the war was engaged in: yet, as France would not give the least attention to their propositions for preserving the peace, that forced acknowledgment became, by that treaty, and the war that ensued, absolutely null and void, and could in no degree affect a subsequent and more extensive engagement: consequently the war meditated by King WILLIAM, and waged by Queen ANNE, was to be carried on against PHILIP upon the throne, until a measure should be previously taken to prevent for ever the union of the two crowns; and no such measure was proposed by France in 1706. How then does this author dare to affirm, that the allies might have had a peace at that time agreeable to the principles of their grand alliance?

AND

AND here I cannot forbear adding (although I shall have occasion to speak more fully on this subject hereafter) that when this great affair, relating to the union of the two crowns, came to be canvassed in 1712 between England and France, our author, in his letters to the French secretary of state, \* declares, " That the  
 " article concerning the union of the two monarchies is  
 " of so great consequence, as well for the Queen, as for  
 " the rest of Europe, for the present age, and for posterity, that all the advantages that could possibly be stipulated, would be paid for too dearly, in accepting an  
 " expedient too weak to obviate such a real danger."

NOTWITHSTANDING the strong declarations of this nature, frequently repeated by the author himself, he proposed and insisted upon a renunciation, as a sufficient expedient to prevent the greatest mischief that could possibly happen to all Europe, and to Great Britain in particular; although M. TORCY, the French secretary of state, gave him early notice, † by telling him fairly and plainly, that such an expedient was insufficient, and would be deemed, by the fundamental and unalterable laws of France, null and void.

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\* Report of the Secret Committee, 1715, Appendix, N° 16. 18.

† Ibid. Appendix, N° 15.



AND yet this modest author would make posterity believe, that “ \* it was no paradox to affirm, that the expedient that was taken, and was always obvious to be taken [meaning a renunciation] was in its nature more effectual than any that could have been taken; and that some of them who opposed the peace, and attempted to ridicule it then, have since that time had occasion to see, though the case has not happened, how effectual it would have been, if it had; and that he who should go about to ridicule it, after our experience, would only make himself ridiculous.”

Now at the time when this expedient was made use of, not only the opposers of the peace in England, but all Europe, except the author and his Jacobite friends, ridiculed it; and even France itself, with whom it was settled, in effect declared it to be ridiculous, as what could never take effect without subverting the fundamental laws of that kingdom: and as the case has never happened, how does it appear, that it would have been effectual, if it had, when there has been no trial of it? Or what is that experience we have had, since the case

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\* Page 75, 76.

has not yet happened, that it would be effectual, should it happen in any future time? for the expedient of a renunciation would then, by the fundamental laws of France, be null and void: of which there had been ample experience made before in the reign of LEWIS the Fourteenth, who, upon the death of PHILIP the Fourth, invaded part of the Low Countries, as devolved to him in right of his queen; notwithstanding the most solemn renunciations of that right, by oath, twice repeated; first upon the conclusion, and afterwards upon the celebration of his marriage: and therefore this jingling and equivocating trope—"That the expedient " would have been effectual, had the case ever happened—" and that we have had the experience of what " has never happened"—is not only a paradox, but most egregious nonsense; and the ridicule recoils upon the author himself.

NOR does it appear that the expedient, weak and insufficient as it is, was ever promised by France in 1706; or what those " effectual bars were, which, the author " says, would have been opposed to the union of the " two monarchies by a treaty of peace in 1706, if a " prince of the royal family of France had remained in " possession of Spain and the West Indies."

FOR



For the expedient which was taken in 1712, and which the author \* says, “ was always obvious to be taken, of  
 “ excluding PHILIP and his race from the succession of  
 “ France, by creating an interest in all the other princes  
 “ of the blood, and by consequence a party in France itself  
 “ for their exclusion,” would, I am afraid, be by no means an effectual bar for that purpose, as it is notorious, that if the present French king had died without issue male, during the life of the late king of Spain (as was more than once apprehended) PHILIP was ready and determined, notwithstanding his most solemn renunciations at the peace of Utrecht, to attempt to get possession of the crown of France; as may be seen by the † instructions drawn and signed by himself, which he gave to the Abbot de MONTGON, when he sent him to Paris to negotiate with the French nobility, for their support of his pretensions to succeed, if that event should happen: and as to the princes of the blood; the next two branches of that royal family, that of Orleans, and that of Bourbon-Condé, were in such a state of animosity and hatred towards each other, that the latter, instead of concurring with his party and influence, as a common interest, to

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\* Page 75.

† Dec. 24, 1726. Memoires de l'Abbé de Montgon, tom. iii. p. 70.

place the family of Orleans upon that throne, would have assisted PHILIP in his attempt to get possession of it; of which he gave the strongest assurances to the said Abbot, when he founded the Duke of BOURBON's inclinations, and \* communicated to him, according to his instructions, in confidence, the king of Spain's intentions: and PHILIP was so fully persuaded, that, if the case had existed, he should have succeeded, that, although at the time when the French king was taken ill of the small-pox in 1728, he had from a melancholy disorder kept his bed for several months, upon the news of his majesty's illness, he immediately roused his spirits from the fit of lethargy, and, under colour of going to church to pray for the recovery of his royal nephew, he made preparations, in case of his death, to gallop, if I may so say, with five hundred horse only, to Paris; presuming, not without reason (as the author of the sketch, I do not doubt, as well as myself, verily believed at that time) that he would have met with a favourable reception, and have been acknowledged king of France. And it is now the prevailing opinion there, that, upon a vacancy of that throne by the death of LEWIS the Fifteenth, and extinction of his race without issue male, the fundamental laws of that

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\* Memoires de Montgon, tom. iii. p. 219—226.

kingdom



kingdom would take place, and the present Spanish branch of the house of Bourbon would succeed, in preference to that of Orleans: so that this expedient of excluding PHILIP and his race from the succession of France, by creating an interest in all the other princes of the blood, and a party in France for that exclusion, would prove vain and imaginary: and this expedient, weak as it is, was never offered by France in 1706.

IN short, by all that is any where extant, the scheme for this plausible and complete pacification seems to have been no other than that contained in the \* French king's letter to the Pope in 1707; and therefore it may deserve some notice.

“ WE are intrusted,” says his most Christian majesty,  
 “ with powers from our grandson to convey to the arch-  
 “ duke, part of those estates that compose the Spanish  
 “ monarchy. The Catholic king has the hearts of the true  
 “ Spaniards, and is content to reign over them: it only  
 “ depends on the Emperor to explain himself; he may  
 “ have, if he pleases, for ever re-united to his family,  
 “ the Milanese, Naples, and Sicily, with the other islands

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\* Bishop Hare's Works, vol. iii. p. 19. Burnet, vol. ii. 1707.

“ in

“ in the Mediterranean ; we should easily agree about a  
 “ barrier for the republic of Holland : and the two pre-  
 “ tences for the war being removed, it would not be  
 “ difficult to put an end to those misfortunes Europe has  
 “ been so long oppressed with.”

THESE very loose and superficial offers for concluding so great a work as a general peace, to the satisfaction of all the allies, from a prince whose whole reign had been one continued scene of perfidy, could have no other tendency or view, but to amuse and divide them ; for your Lordship will observe, how little notice is taken of the respective pretensions of all the allies : the Dutch barrier is mentioned in general words only ; not one word is said relating to the security of the trade and navigation of England and Holland ; or to the preventing for ever the union of the two crowns of France and Spain ; in short, nothing is specifically expressed in this conciliating plan, but what relates to the Emperor ; who might very probably like what was yielded to him, in case of a partition ; but conscious that his acceptance of these cessions to him alone, would be dishonourable to himself, and ungrateful to his allies ; that it might dissolve the confederacy, and consequently put it into the power of France to obstruct the execution of them ; and that having thus  
 created



created a division among the allies, she would be enabled to dictate the terms of a general peace, according to her arbitrary will and pleasure (as by a separate and treacherous proceeding, managed by this our author, did some years after come to pass): his Imperial majesty, I say, upon these considerations, honestly and wisely refused his attention to such deceitful insinuations for his own particular advantage, not doubting (though, by this same author too, he was afterwards sadly disappointed) but his faithful allies would act the same honourable part towards him, should any separate temptation be thrown in the way of any of them to his prejudice, contrary to treaty.

BUT to return to our author—We have seen how far short he falls of a proof of his main proposition—That the offers of France were fair, and might and ought to have been accepted, upon the principles of the grand alliance.—He could not but be sensible, that this could no otherwise be made appear to any impartial judge, than by shewing plainly, that the offers made were answerable to the important ends proposed in that treaty, and to the just demands of all and every of the parties to it: but to attempt this was labour of the worst sort, labour in vain; and so not caring to puzzle about it, he by a stroke of his masterly pen cuts at once this Gordian knot  
of

of an intricate and troublesome confederacy; in his notable manner flights all apprehension of obstacles, and finds the way to a general peace as smooth and practicable as can be wished. “If a prince,” \* he says, “of the house of Bourbon had remained in possession of Spain and the West Indies, no advantage would have thereby accrued to France; the Italian provinces would by this partition have fallen to the share of the house of Austria; the particular demands of England and Holland would have suffered no difficulty; and those we were obliged by treaty to make for others, would have been easy to adjust.”

UPON this he triumphs, his cause is gained, and he descants upon the happy consequences attending his imaginary scheme in a most elegant and florid style:

† “WOULD not this have been enough for the public security, for the common interest, and for the glory of our arms; to have humbled and reduced, in five campaigns, a power that had disturbed and insulted Europe for almost forty years; to have restored, in so short a time, the balance of power in Europe to a suf-

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\* Page 83, 84.

† P. 84.

“ ficient



“ ficient point of equality, after it had been more than  
 “ fifty years, that is, from the treaty of Westphalia, in  
 “ a gradual deviation from this point; in short, to have  
 “ retrieved in 1706, a game that was become desperate  
 “ at the beginning of the century? To have done all  
 “ this, before the war had exhausted our strength, was  
 “ the utmost, sure, that any man could desire, who in-  
 “ tended the public good alone.”

THIS indeed appears to be a glorious scene, finely illu-  
 minated with a blaze of dazzling words; but it is no more  
 than mere scenery at last; for no plan (as has been fully  
 made appear) that might have produced such a train of  
 happy consequences, ever existed in 1706; not even in the  
 author's poetical brain, till many years after, when it was  
 thought necessary, in order to justify the scandalous peace  
 he himself had negociated privately with France. “ The  
 “ demands of England and Holland suffered then (as he  
 “ says) no difficulty; and those we were obliged by treaty  
 “ to make for the rest of the allies, were truly very easily  
 “ adjusted;” for this plain reason; because they never  
 came under any formal deliberation by a joint concert,  
 according to treaty: the States, and the rest of our allies,  
 were shamefully abandoned by us, without the least pro-  
 vocation; and their interests, as well as our own, were  
 N sacrificed

sacrificed and submitted to the mercy of our reduced enemy, and to such terms as he would condescend to grant; terms, than which more ignominious could not have been imposed, if France, instead of having been constantly beaten in all parts, had been victorious both by sea and land for ten years together.

THIS must be allowed to be a short and commodious way of removing all difficulties, and of adjusting every thing with ease; and perfectly corresponds with the offers which the French king opened to the Pope in 1706-7: but the author, however fertile in fiction, had no other contrivance to cover or colour his own infamous behaviour, but by falsely and maliciously arraigning that of another administration, above forty years after, for not having acted such a perfidious part, at a time when he and his friends had a share in the management of affairs, and then most zealously supported and applauded the conduct of them.

LETTER



## LETTER VI.

WE will now suppose, my Lord, that a plan was offered by France in 1706, agreeable to the principles of the grand alliance of 1701, as stated by the author; and that the object of the war at that time was a partition, by which PHILIP was to be left upon the throne of Spain: we will examine whether, considering the engagements contracted by subsequent treaties, and and the course and events of the war in consequence of them, it would have been honourable or just, or consistent with the general interest of Europe, and the particular interest of England, to have entered into a negotiation for concluding a peace, upon the principles of such a plan.

UPON the death of the king of Spain, LEWIS the Fourteenth had made himself master of the whole Spanish monarchy: an overbearing and imperious exertion of his extensive power, and his haughtiness in scornfully rejecting all reasonable terms of accommodation,

had forced the Emperor and the maritime powers into a new grand alliance and a war.

CONTRARY to all human appearance, the military operations soon proved to the advantage of the allies; which encouraged the King of Portugal and the Duke of SAVOY to pursue their inclinations, and their own as well as the common interest of Europe, by leaving the house of Bourbon, and entering into offensive and defensive alliances with the Emperor and the maritime powers.

THE author of the sketch mentions only the first of these treaties, and that with great contempt; although, besides the particular and extensive \* benefits in trade, which England then obtained from the crown of Portugal, it opened an entrance to the confederates into the

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\* Treaty of Commerce with Portugal, concluded Dec. 27, 1703.

Art. 1. The king of Portugal promises in his own name, and that of his successors, to admit for ever hereafter into Portugal the woollen cloths, and the rest of the woollen manufactures of the Britains, on condition— That at no time, whether in peace, or war between Great Britain and France, any duty shall be demanded for Portugal wines imported into Great Britain, more than for the like quantity of French wine, abating one third of the custom. Art. 2.

heart



heart of Spain: and he says not one word of that with Savoy, which was of so singular an advantage to the common cause: it struck the house of Bourbon with the greatest astonishment and concern, foreseeing the fatal consequences to their interests from the defection of that prince.

THE acknowledging the Arch-duke as king of Spain, and a joint exertion of the utmost efforts to put him in possession of that monarchy, was the foundation of these treaties; which was by no means a deviation from the grand alliance, but intirely consonant thereto, being considered as the only effectual way to prevent for ever the union of the crowns of France and Spain, expressly stipulated in the articles of it. It would have been vain, and indeed ridiculous, to think of engaging those two powers in so hazardous an undertaking, without stipulating at the same time some particular advantages in their favour.

IT was therefore agreed by the treaty with Portugal, as before observed—That no peace or truce should be made with the enemy, but in common concert; nor as long as any of the family of Bourbon should continue in Spain: and that the Arch-duke, when settled on that throne,

throne, should yield to his Portuguese majesty some important places, with their districts, in Spain and the West Indies.

A CESSION of several places and territories in Italy was made to the Duke of SAVOY; and a right to succeed to the Spanish monarchy, in virtue of the will of PHILIP the Fourth, preferably to any other power after the house of Austria, were expressly reserved to him.

THE measures and operations pursued in consequence of these treaties, were attended with such a series of surprising victories and conquests over the house of Bourbon, in all parts of Europe, that the affairs of those two crowns were reduced to the greatest distress in 1706.

“ I need not (as the \* author says) recall the events of  
 “ that and of the precedent years of the war : not only  
 “ the arms of France had been defeated, on every side,  
 “ but the inward state of that kingdom was already more  
 “ exhausted than it had ever been : she went on indeed,  
 “ but she staggered and reeled under the burden of the  
 “ war.



Now at this fortunate period of 1706 (when the affairs of the allies were in so glorious, and those of the two crowns in so desperate a situation) we are to suppose that France sued (as the author expresses it) for a peace, in order to put an end to the calamities of war; and that a partition, by which PHILIP was to be left in the possession of Spain and the West Indies, was to be the foundation of it.

If so, we must have obliged King CHARLES to give up such a hopeful prospect of succeeding to that crown, and to abandon his faithful subjects to be treated, sooner or later (as the poor Catalans afterwards were) as rebels. By this we should have violated the most solemn engagements contracted with Portugal and Savoy (whose accession to the grand alliance had been so useful in reducing the house of Bourbon to so low a condition): we should have broken at once the most essential articles of those treaties, upon which the motives were founded, that induced those powers to renounce their prior engagements with France and Spain, and to co-operate with us in support of the common cause, at the risk of their own intire ruin.

WOULD

Would not such an unnecessary, unprovoked, and base desertion have been the 'greatest breach of public faith, inconsistent with the rules of honour, honesty, common sense, and reason, and even with our own interest; who were more immediately concerned than any other nation, that Spain and the West Indies should not be possessed by a branch of the house of Bourbon? Such a proceeding must have dissolved the grand alliance, and left the confederates to shift for themselves; a general confusion must have ensued; and all Europe have been exposed for their security to the arbitration of France. The British nation would have been for ever stigmatized with an indelible blot of weakness and perfidy: and the author himself and his friends (for they had already begun their secret machinations at court against the Duke of MARLBOROUGH and Lord GODOLPHIN) would, I do not doubt, have been the first and the loudest to arraign their conduct, for having sacrificed to some particular views the balance of Europe, with the glory, interest, and safety of their queen and country. This would have been a most wonderful catastrophe, unknown to former ages, and which latest posterity would hardly have believed possible, had not this author and his cabal, when they were in power, executed a plan of iniquity of as black and detestable a nature.

AFTER



AFTER what has been fairly stated, I am persuaded, that your Lordship is astonished at the author's presumption, in \* asking, " Why a proper use was not made of  
 " the success of the confederates against France and  
 " Spain ? and why a peace was not concluded in the fifth  
 " year of the war ?"

Now as long as France did not propose, that PHILIP should give up Spain and the West Indies, the ends of the war were not obtained ; for after the conclusion of the treaties with Portugal and Savoy, that point was made more than ever, if possible, the object of the war ; and as long as that was not offered as a foundation for peace, the continuance of it with our utmost efforts, in order to bring the two crowns to consent to that necessary condition, was the use which was made of the success of the confederates against France and Spain ; and it was the only true and proper use that could be made of it ; any other use (I mean such as the author suggests) would have been weak and treacherous. And here I should be glad to know, if any of the author's friends can shew, from any of his posthumous works that have

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\* Page 67.

not yet appeared (for he had the modesty not to suffer his sketch to be published till after his death, although written several years before; not caring, I suppose, to stand the shame of his abominable fictions); whether, I say, they can shew, that he or his friends the Tories (for they were greatly concerned in the administration) appeared to find fault with, or to give their opinion against the treaties made in 1703 with Portugal and Savoy, on account of its being therein stipulated—That no branch of the house of Bourbon should be left in possession of Spain and the West Indies; whether the Tories thought the plan laid down in those treaties was such a one as England and Holland should never have entered into; nay, whether they did not applaud the plan, for being (as it certainly was) a master-piece of political wisdom at that great juncture.

It is true, that the Earl of NOTTINGHAM, then secretary of state, was not willing to agree to the article in that with Portugal, by which that king demanded the honour of the flag, and other marks of respect to be paid by our admirals, when they should be in his ports; but this was thought an objection too inconsiderable to be insisted on: all the affairs of Europe (as BURNET observes) seemed to turn upon this treaty; and such an important



portant transaction ought not to be retarded a day for such a punctilio as a salute and the striking of a flag. But it does not appear, that the Earl of NOTTINGHAM, or any of that party, made the least objection to the articles which stipulated, “ that no branch of the house “ of Bourbon should be left in possession of Spain and “ the West Indies : ” and it is to be observed, that when that Lord resigned the seals, Mr. HARLEY was \* made secretary of state in his place, the next year after the conclusion of these treaties with Portugal and Savoy ; and can it be imagined, that he would have been advanced to the department for foreign affairs, if he and his friends had expressed their dislike to the terms of the treaties of 1703, and to the measures pursued to carry them into execution, which were pressed and supported with great earnestness and zeal by Lord GODOLPHIN ? nay, unless they had openly shewn their approbation of them : and therefore any subsequent declaration made by those gentlemen, many years after the time of these transactions, of their having wished and desired in 1706 (that famous period of victories and glory on the side of the allies) a peace to have been made ; and that the most

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\* N. B. Mansell, an intimate friend of Mr. Harley, was made about the same time comptroller of the household.

essential points of the treaties of 1703, for the sake of which those treaties were made, should have been given up; and the fruits of our expensive and successful efforts intirely lost; is as subject to suspicion and disbelief, as the making of such a peace would have been absurd and shameful; and consequently such a declaration, without any shadow of proof, cannot deserve the least weight or credit.

BUT the \* author says, " He does not remember any  
" parliamentary declaration for continuing the war, till  
" PHILIP should be dethroned, before the year 1706."

EITHER he must have fallen into a sad state of lethargy and forgetfulness, or he must imagine that others, who lived at that time, and are now in being, must intirely have lost their memories; or else he must have presumed, that nobody would think it worth their while in order to convict him of a notorious falshood, to have recourse to the journals of Parliament.

Now, my Lord, if you will cast your eye upon that obvious and infallible evidence, you will find, that—



“ The necessary supplies to support our engagements  
 “ with Portugal and Savoy, for recovering the monarchy  
 “ of Spain from the house of Bourbon, and restoring it  
 “ to the house of Austria, as being of the greatest ad-  
 “ vantage and importance to the Queen and her allies,  
 “ as affording the fairest prospect of bringing the war to  
 “ a glorious conclusion; as the only means to fix the  
 “ balance of power, to preserve the liberties of Europe,  
 “ and to procure a safe, lasting, and honourable peace;”  
 are earnestly recommended and demanded by the Queen  
 in all her speeches from the throne; and cheerfully con-  
 curred in and agreed to, for these great purposes, in all  
 the addresses of both houses, by express words, or words  
 carrying the same sense, from the year 1703 to 1706.

AND here it may not be improper to observe, that the  
 reduction of the Spanish monarchy to the house of Au-  
 stria, and for that purpose the making good our treaties  
 with Portugal and Savoy, continued annually, with the  
 success of our military operations, to be the language and  
 spirit of the Queen’s speeches and the addresses of Par-  
 liament, from 1706 until 1711: and notwithstanding the  
 \* author’s violent exclamations against this object, “ as

“ unnecessary and chimerical; as a new plan, contrary  
 “ to the principles of the grand alliance; as a plan of  
 “ passion, avarice, and ambition, of private interest, the  
 “ private interest of particular persons and particular  
 “ states, to which the interest of Europe was sacrificed;”  
 he might have recollected, if his memory had not again  
 failed him, that after the alteration in the ministry in  
 1710, and the choice of a new Parliament, composed of  
 a majority of members whose views and principles were  
 agreeable to his own, the Queen recommended from the  
 throne \*—“ The carrying on the war in all its parts, but  
 “ particularly in Spain, with the utmost vigour, as the  
 “ likeliest means to procure a safe and honourable peace  
 “ for us and all our allies; whose support and interest,  
 “ (her majesty added) she had truly at heart.”

AND the Commons made in return an address to the  
 Queen as zealous and hearty to the same effect: and †  
 not long after, when a message from the Queen was de-  
 livered by the author himself, then secretary of state, to  
 the Commons, to acquaint them, that there had been an  
 action in Spain, very much to the disadvantage of King  
 CHARLES's affairs, they even then assured her majesty,

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\* Nov. 27, 1710.

† Jan. 2, 1710-11.



that this disadvantage should not discourage them from using their utmost endeavours to enable her to carry on the just and necessary war in which she was engaged, for preserving the liberties of Europe; and that they were resolved to support her effectually in the prosecution of the measures that her majesty should think proper for retrieving the loss in Spain.

Now is it possible to imagine, that by these strong recommendations from the throne, and assurances from Parliament of vigorous measures to carry on the just and necessary war for preserving the liberties of Europe, and particularly in Spain, and for retrieving the loss King CHARLES had suffered there, it was intended; that PHILIP should remain in possession of Spain and the West Indies? and nothing more was to be procured or secured, than some of the outskirts of the Spanish monarchy for the house of Austria; which, the \* author says, “ was  
 “ our engagement; and was not in the same disproportion to our strength, as the engagement of the French  
 “ to maintain the Spanish monarchy intire, under the dominion of PHILIP, exceeded their strength.”

THIS jingling and jostling together of the words "engagement and strength, and strength and engagement," is a specimen of the many pretty antitheses, of different turns, which are scattered through his amusing and incoherent rhapsody, to entertain the reader, and make him believe by such witticisms and refined reasoning, for want of argument and proofs, that our engagements by the grand alliance to procure the Emperor reasonable satisfaction for his pretensions to the crown of Spain, meant no more than to procure only some of the outskirts of that monarchy for the house of Austria.

UPON the whole, I flatter myself that your Lordship, having seriously considered the various engagements which the maritime powers contracted with other potentates, relative to the succession of the Spanish monarchy; the several circumstances of affairs, and the events of war, from 1689 to 1706, as stated in the aforesaid deductions, will be of opinion,

FIRST, That the author has willingly and shamefully endeavoured to pervert the terms, sense, and views of the grand alliance of 1701, in order to serve his own purposes; and to frame an imaginary plan of offers for a peace, pretended to have been made by France in 1706 upon



upon the principles of that alliance, when no such offers had been made by that crown to the allies at that time.

SECONDLY, That if a plan had been offered for a partition, by which any branch of the house of Bourbon was to be left in possession of Spain and the West Indies, it would have been neither safe, honourable, or just on the part of England, to have thereupon concluded a peace in 1706.

THE END OF PART I.

P            LETTERS

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OF



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L E T T E R S

T O A

N O B L E L O R D.

P A R T II.

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LETTERS  
LETTERS

NORFOLK  
TO A

NORFOLK  
LETTERS

PART II  
I have the pleasure to inform you that the  
first volume of the series has been published  
and is now in the hands of the printer.

A further detail of the progress of the work  
will be given in a separate letter to the  
effect of the progress of the work and the  
time of publication.



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# L E T T E R S

T O A

## N O B L E L O R D.

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### L E T T E R VII.

M Y L O R D,

**I** AM now to lay before your Lordship the subsequent events of the war, from 1706 to 1709 and 1710, and the negotiations relative to peace during those years, particularly the two last.

A PRECISE detail of the military operations would be tedious and unnecessary, when a general survey of the most remarkable transactions, and the consequences of them,

them, may be sufficient to shew, that LEWIS the Fourteenth was reduced to such streights, as made it reasonable to expect he would at last conclude a peace upon such terms as the allies, by their mutual obligations to each other ought, and by the wonderful success of their arms might justly require of him.

THE events of \* this campaign were various; but chiefly to the disadvantage of the confederates.

IN Italy the French and Spaniards evacuated Lombardy by capitulation, in concert with the Imperial court.

NAPLES, and that whole kingdom, were taken by General THAUN, and the Spanish places upon the coast of Tuscany reduced.

IN Spain, the confederate army was beaten at Almanza; and the enemy retook, in consequence of that victory, so many places, as threw the affairs of King CHARLES into great disorder.

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\* 1707.



THE siege of Toulon, an enterprize of great views and expectations, was unaccountably raised by those brave generals the Duke of SAVOY and Prince EUGENE: however the royal navy of France suffered greatly from the bombs and fire of the British fleet, and the French were forced to sink many large ships, which became irrecoverably lost: besides, the uneasiness and apprehensions the French court was under for that important place, had obliged them to make such detachments for its relief, from Germany and Italy, as checked the progress of their arms in other parts, and particularly in Spain.

I CANNOT forbear observing by the by, that the fatal disappointment of this noble and promising design was attributed to several different causes: it was imagined by some, that the sending twelve thousand men for the reduction of Naples made the confederate army too weak to carry on the siege, while the enemy's forces daily increased; by others, that the influence of the Jesuits prevailed upon the bigotry of the Imperial court, not to suffer a place and country of such consequence to fall into the possession of the heretical maritime powers: but a remarkable anecdote came out afterwards, which accounted for this extraordinary miscarriage.

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THE

THE Duke of MARLBOROUGH, before the opening of the campaign this year, made the King of Sweden a visit in Saxony; and there is no doubt but that, by his address, he gained so far upon the enterprizing genius of that prince, or rather upon his chief minister, as to divert him from taking any part with France against the grand alliance: however, it seems, when the design against Toulon was discovered, the French and Bavarian ministers who attended his Swedish majesty, prevailed upon him, by the influence of Count PIPER, to cause insinuations to be made in great secrecy to the Duke of SAVOY, not to persist in the siege of Toulon; intimating, that if that town was taken, he, the King of Sweden, should be obliged to enter into the hereditary countries of the Emperor. The consideration of the fatal consequences to the common cause, with which such an attempt might be attended, made his Royal Highness prefer the public good to his own glory, and was the secret reason (Lamberti \* says) for raising the siege of Toulon. The same author adds, that the public, which remained in ignorance for many years, may imagine that this anecdote is pure invention; but that the Duke of SAVOY himself is a voucher for the truth of it, having

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\* Lamberti, vol. iv. p. 569.



been pleased to declare it to several persons of character and credit.—But to return from this digression.

IN Germany, VILLARS attacked and forced the Imperial lines at Stollhoffen, and laid Suabia under contribution; but the army of the empire being put under the command of the Elector of Hanover, he gained a considerable advantage over the French, and obliged VILLARS to retire to Strasburgh.

IN Flanders, the Duke of MARLBOROUGH did all he could to provoke the enemy to a battle; but VENDOSME took care to lodge his army in such safe camps, that his Grace could not venture to attack him, or force him to an action; so the campaign there was very inoffensive on both sides.

THE French were so elated with their apparent advantages during the operations of this year, that they talked very big, and made not the least step towards a negotiation for peace. \* A French commissary, who had been at the confederate army, very pertly told the Duke of MARLBOROUGH, that the French king, notwithstand-

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\* Lamberti, vol. iv. p. 501.

ing his progress in Spain and Germany, was disposed to hearken to propositions for restoring the tranquillity of Europe: his Grace with a noble scorn replied, that after matters should be pushed to a certain point, the allies might listen to propositions, which France might be reduced to make for her own safety.

\* AT the end of this year, the Lords and Commons joined in an address for restoring the whole Spanish monarchy to the house of Austria, as necessary to establish a just balance of power in Europe; and what was remarkable on this occasion, it took its rise in the house of Lords, was unanimous, and the Lord ROCHESTER, with the Tory party, were the chief promoters of it.

IN the beginning of † this year, a French fleet, with the Pretender and a considerable body of land forces on board, sailed from Dunkirk, and attempted an invasion in Scotland, but was disappointed by the vigilance of Sir GEORGE BYNG.

IN Italy, VILLARS took the towns of Sezane: but the Duke of SAVOY made himself master of Exilles, Fenef-

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\* Dec. 22, 1707. † 1708.



trelles, and Perouse; by which means the Alps were cleared, and Dauphiny was open to him.

THE Pope having threatened the Emperor with ecclesiastical censures for possessing himself of Commachio, and taking quarters in the papal territories, began to levy troops as if he intended to make war in earnest; but was at last obliged to submit to his Imperial majesty's terms, and acknowledged the Arch-duke CHARLES in quality of king of Spain.

IN Spain, the campaign was more equally balanced: the Duke of ORLEANS took Tortosa, and Denia was obliged to capitulate; but Sardinia and Minorca were reduced by the allies: the first was of great service to supply Catalonia with provisions, and Port Mahon afforded a safe harbour for our fleet to lay in, refit, and retire into on all occasions: 'till then they had no place nearer than Lisbon. This advantage made a great impression on all the princes and states of Italy.

IN Flanders, the Court of France, to encourage their frequently beaten and disheartened troops, put the princes of the blood at the head of their army.

By intrigues and practices with the inhabitants, they got possession of Ghent and Bruges, and had formed a design upon Audenarde; but the expeditious and fatiguing march of the confederate forces under the command of Prince EUGENE and the Duke of MARLBOROUGH, prevented the views of the enemy, and gave occasion to the bloody engagement near that place; which not beginning till five in the afternoon, was interrupted by the night coming on: the allies, as long as the battle lasted, were victorious, with a very inconsiderable loss on their side; that of the enemy was great, and their whole army (it is thought) would have been intirely destroyed, had not the want of day-light put an end to the rout.

THE allies, after this victory, resolved to besiege Lille, which, considering the strength of the fortifications, the number of the garrison, and the bravery of BOUFFLERS who defended it, as well as the hazard of the enemy's being able to intercept the necessary convoys for furnishing the besiegers with ammunition and provisions, was looked upon to be so bold an undertaking, that it was scarcely to be justified, though attended with success. But not to enter into a detail of the various motions and remarkable events that happened during this siege, all redounded



dounded greatly to the honour of the two generals engaged in it. Lille, the capital of French Flanders, a place of the highest importance with respect to the security and trade of the maritime powers, was with its citadel taken, to the great mortification of the French ; but afterwards, to the no less mortification of the allies and the surprize of all Europe, was, by the treacherous negotiations of the author of the sketch, unnecessarily restored to France.—After the taking of that fortress, Ghent, Bruges, Pleffendale, and Leffinghen, which the French had made themselves masters of, were soon recovered.

IN Germany, the Electors of Bavaria and Hanover, who commanded the respective armies there, were so weak, that they were unable to undertake any thing of consequence on that side ; but during the siege of Lille the Elector of Bavaria, on account of his having a great party and influence in Brussels, marched with a considerable body of troops and a train of artillery, to attack that city : after several assaults with great fury, he was repulsed, and obliged to give up that enterprize.

ON this occasion the Duke of MARLBOROUGH marched, passed the Schelde, and broke through the  
French

French lines, which were seventy miles in length, and thought impregnable : their abandoning without any opposition these extensive retrenchments, on which they had been working for many weeks, was a surprize to all the world ; their councils (as BURNET observes) seemed to be weak, and the execution of them was worse ; so that they who had been so long the terror, were now become the scorn of Europe. The mint bills in France were at this time 40 per Cent. discount, and the people in great distress.

THE French court made this year new attempts to detach the King of Portugal from the grand alliance ; but that prince continued firm to his engagements.

FRANCE, in this distracted condition of her affairs, both at home and abroad, to appease the clamour of her miserable subjects, to make the allies more slack and remiss in their warlike preparations, and to create (if possible) jealousies and divisions among them, had recourse to all imaginable arts and intrigues to make the belief of an approaching peace generally prevail.

HER emissary HELVETIUS had been sent again into Holland ; CHAMILLARD, the prime minister of France, came



came to the frontiers of the Low Countries during the siege of Lisle: \* rumours of negotiations upon several furnished projects of a partition, were spread in various courts: PETKUM, the resident of Holstein at the Hague, made a journey to Paris, with a pass from M. DE TORCY, and afterwards held a correspondence with that French minister of state: the Pensionary of Holland, Prince EUGENE, and Lord MARLBOROUGH were privy to this commerce of letters between PETKUM and TORCY, and connived at it, with a real design to forward a negotiation for an honourable peace, as well as to obviate the impression which the French endeavoured to make to the disadvantage of the principal allies, as if they were intirely averse to any steps tending to put an end to the war; but to remove at the same time the uneasiness which ministers of the other confederates had conceived from the discovery of the private intercourse with a French minister, the strongest assurances were given, that nothing should be finally concluded, unless jointly with their participation and consent. France at last caused insinuations to be made by PETKUM, of her disposition to enter into a peace upon propositions that should be agreeable and satisfactory to all the allies. As these infi-

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\* 1708, 1709.

uations were conceived in vague and general terms, and not delivered by sufficient authority, she was given to understand, that if her intentions for putting an end to the war were sincere, she ought to send a person of character, empowered to make offers that were neither clandestine nor illusive.

UPON this foundation passports were demanded and granted for the President ROUILLE', \* who accordingly came into Holland, and had conferences, at a place appointed, with the Pensionaries of Amsterdam and Tergaw: sent to meet him for that purpose.

THE result of this meeting, and of the negotiations that followed, for settling, in several conferences between the Ministers of the principal allies, and Mess. TORCY and ROUILLE' on the part of France, the famous preliminary treaty at the Hague, will be the contents of another letter.

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\* March 1709.

L E T T E R



## L E T T E R    V I I I .

M Y L O R D ,

**B**EFORE I proceed to give an account of the artful and dexterous management of the French ministers, and of the prudent and steady conduct of those of the allies, previous to, as well as during the course of the negotiation for settling preliminaries of peace at the Hague, your Lordship will excuse my giving you the trouble of one observation on this important subject; which is,—That a sole, absolute monarch, possessed of contiguous extensive dominions, has great advantages over a confederacy of many enemies, as well in the negotiations of peace, as the operations of war: the acceptance or refusal, the advancing, pursuing, or altering of proposals, are all in one breast; the resolves and execution of all councils and measures are determined by the will of a single person: he is concerned for nobody's interest but his own; is sole master of all his views and actions, to be managed and

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directed

directed without controul, as circumstances require ; he has opportunities at the same time, by his emissaries and brigues, to create jealousies in order to divide the allies.

IN a confederacy of several parties against one common enemy, the restrictive obligation (which is always a condition in defensive and offensive alliances) of doing nothing relative to war or peace without the concert or consent of all the contracting parties, may, for want of that necessary concurrence, check and even disappoint the execution of very salutary schemes ; their various and jarring interests may make some of them liable to temptation and defection ; and the corruption or detachment of one considerable friend may cause the dissolution of a whole alliance.

LEWIS the Fourteenth had all the advantages attending a sole and absolute power, and made use of them with great success in all his wars and negotiations, from the conclusion of the Pyrenean treaty to the rupture in 1701-2.

AN example so fatal to the liberties of Europe, should be a warning to the chief leaders of a confederacy ; and make them attentive to employ their utmost care in the manage-



management of a common cause, to preserve a perfect harmony between the contracting powers.

THE superior genius of the Duke of MARLBOROUGH made this principle a fundamental rule in all his conduct, and (what was never known before in any age, where a confederacy consisted of so many independent powers for so long a time) it constantly prevailed, and was attended with incredible success, as long as he remained at the head of the last grand alliance. Some of the allies might perhaps, now and then, prove selfish, timid, or backward in pursuing measures that required vigour and expedition; and projects of importance and of hopeful expectation may thereby have been retarded or laid aside; but that great and wise general and minister took care not to suffer France to make an advantage of a difference in opinion amongst them; the consequence of which might have been much more pernicious to the common interest, than the prospect of the execution of those projects could be promising. The intrigues and artifices of France had no more influence on the councils of the allies, than her arms had success in the military operations: the whole body seemed to be actuated by one soul, to such a degree, and with so good an effect, that a general peace, in all human appearance, as honourable, safe, and

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AN example so fatal to the liberties of Europe, should be a warning to the chief leaders of a confederacy ; and make them attentive to employ their utmost care in the manage-



management of a common cause, to preserve a perfect harmony between the contracting powers.

THE superior genius of the Duke of MARLBOROUGH made this principle a fundamental rule in all his conduct, and (what was never known before in any age, where a confederacy consisted of so many independent powers for so long a time) it constantly prevailed, and was attended with incredible success, as long as he remained at the head of the last grand alliance. Some of the allies might perhaps, now and then, prove selfish, timid, or backward in pursuing measures that required vigour and expedition; and projects of importance and of hopeful expectation may thereby have been retarded or laid aside; but that great and wise general and minister took care not to suffer France to make an advantage of a difference in opinion amongst them; the consequence of which might have been much more pernicious to the common interest, than the prospect of the execution of those projects could be promising. The intrigues and artifices of France had no more influence on the councils of the allies, than her arms had success in the military operations: the whole body seemed to be actuated by one soul, to such a degree, and with so good an effect, that a general peace, in all human appearance, as honourable, safe, and

satisfactory to all the allies, would have been concluded, as the war had been conducted with unanimity and glory: but the humourfome and ungrateful carriage of one proud woman towards her friend, her mistress, and her sovereign, gave a few ambitious and unskilful persons an opportunity of getting, in the midst of this career of glory and success against the common enemy, the reins of government into their hands.

THE ministry and measures were changed; the reverse of that honest and useful principle, of preserving union and harmony among the confederates, soon took place, and was productive of those fatal consequences that were obvious and natural. A shameful and unprovoked separation from our faithful allies put it into the power of reduced France to dictate the terms of peace to her victorious enemies: terms, not only ignominious and unjust to our friends; but even those granted to ourselves, instead of securing any particular advantages, as a recompence for the sacrifice we made of our allies and our honour (if any thing could be a recompence for so base a behaviour) were detrimental to the interest, trade, and safety of this nation; as will be made appear in the sequel of these letters.

I HOPE



I HOPE your Lordship will not think this an unnecessary digression, as it serves to point out the true and original cause of that scene of iniquity and treachery which followed the alteration of the ministry in 1710.—But to return.

YOUR Lordship will have observed in one of my former, that besides the letters which the Elector of Bavaria had written to the Duke of MARLBOROUGH and the Dutch Deputies, after the battle of Ramillies in 1706 in general terms, relating to peace; an insinuation had been made underhand by France of a disposition to yield Spain and the West Indies, and to grant a good barrier to the States in the Low Countries, with the tariff of 1664; but no attention was given to it, as not coming from a person sufficiently authorised: and it seems the French were so elated with their victory at Almanza, that they took care, immediately after that success, to disavow publickly their having ever insinuated any such offers; and therefore the Dutch Deputies, sent to confer with the President ROUILLE, were directed not to hearken to any proposals from him, less than those which had been privately thrown out in 1706 \*.

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\* Lamberti, vol. v. p. 266.

THE overtures for peace made by the President were not at all explicit, but conceived in captious and ambiguous terms: the Dutch Deputies therefore let him know, that the preliminaries expected by the allies were, the restitution of the whole Spanish monarchy (according to the resolution of the British Parliament) a barrier for the republic of Holland, another for the Emperor and Empire, the demolition of Dunkirk, the acknowledgment of Queen ANNE and the Protestant succession in England, and the sending the Pretender out of the dominions of France.

THE report the Dutch Deputies made to the States of their conferences with M. ROUILLE, and the return of his express from Paris with an answer upon this preliminary plan, gave a hopeful prospect of an approaching peace: the negociation seemed so far advanced, that the Marquis DE TORCY, prime minister of France, was permitted to come to the Hague, in order to bring it to a good and final conclusion: \* he arrived there, and soon after him the President ROUILLE, in the absence of Prince EUGENE, who, upon some motions of the French, was gone to Brabant, and also of the Duke of MARL-

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\* April 1709.



BOROUGH, who had taken a turn into England, to lay before the Queen the state of this important affair, and receive her commands upon it.

DURING this interval of the absence of these great men, the French ministers were very busy in Holland, by themselves and emissaries, among the Deputies of the States, endeavouring, with the specious offer of an extensive barrier and an advantageous commerce, to detach them from their allies; but no temptation could shake their fidelity.

THE Prince and Duke returned to the Hague; TORCY having found it impossible to separate the States from England, affected to own naturally and frankly, in a conference he had with his Grace, that the sad condition of his master's affairs required a peace; that he was sent to ask it; and that he would readily give satisfaction to England as well as Holland, as to their particular demands: the Duke declared to him as plainly, that his mistress had the same pacific disposition, but could hearken to no terms without a restitution of the Spanish monarchy to King CHARLES, and obtaining a good barrier not only for the States General, but also for the Emperor, the Empire, and the Duke of SAVOY.

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THE States General, in order to put an end to these separate transactions and intrigues, which began to raise a jealousy among their friends, came to a formal resolution not to take the least step towards a peace, but in concert with all their allies, and unless they should, as well as themselves, find their satisfaction and advantage in it \*.

THIS steadiness of England and Holland obliged the French ministers, TORCY and ROUILLÉ, to agree to formal meetings and conferences with the ministers of the principal allies at the Pensionary's house. Prince EUGENE, and Count ZINZENDORF after his arrival at the Hague, assisted for the Emperor; the Duke of MARLBOROUGH and Lord TOWNSHEND, who was come over as second plenipotentiary, on the part of England; and the Pensionary of Holland, with those of Amsterdam and Tergaw, for the States.

I MUST beg leave to refer your Lordship for a particular detail of what passed at the various conferences which were held from the twentieth to the twenty-eighth of May, to the writers of that time, particularly

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\* Lamberti, vol. v. p. 275.



to Dr. HARE, late bishop of Chichester, who has entered into a full discussion of this memorable transaction; confining myself to such facts, observations, and reasonings, as seem necessary for setting in a true light what relates to that fundamental point, the restitution of Spain and the West Indies to the house of Austria; which was made the *fine quâ non* for setting on foot that negotiation.

IN the first conference, the French ministers readily agreed to all that was demanded on the part of England and Holland: they proposed indeed to let King PHILIP have Naples and Sicily; but the ministers of the allies having insisted upon the restitution of the whole Spanish monarchy, they soon receded from that proposal, and made no difficulty in giving that satisfaction to the house of Austria. Accordingly \* it was stipulated in the most explicit terms, that his most Christian majesty would take effectual care [*fera en forte*] that the Duke of ANJOU should, with his family, evacuate and give up all the dominions of Spain to King CHARLES, in the space of two months from the first of June.

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\* Art. 4.

BUT in the second conference TORCY opposed with great earnestness what was asked for the security of the Emperor and the Empire, and carried his warmth so far, that he threatened to return immediately to Paris, taking his leave of several persons of consideration.

THIS dissimulation having had no effect, the conferences were renewed, and often carried into a great length; the barriers for the Emperor and Empire, and also for the Duke of SAVOY, were debated with much heat; and the French seemed extremely averse to come into what was demanded for his Royal Highness, while the allies had intelligence, that the French court was privately making, at the same time, great offers to that prince.

IN short, the French ministers for a long while pretended, they had no instructions to agree to any preliminaries on those heads; and therefore they must suspend their assent until the further pleasure of the king their master should be known.

\* This management in disputing so obstinately the pretensions of the Emperor and the Duke of SAVOY,

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\* Bishop of Chichester, vol. iii. p. 95, &c.



after they had agreed so readily to the restitution of the whole Spanish monarchy, could have no other meaning than to ensnare the maritime powers, and to draw them into a base design to sacrifice the interest of their allies, and to create divisions among them.

THE scheme failing by the firm adherence of England and Holland to the rest of their friends, there was one point still to be adjusted, which, in effect, included all the rest; and that was, to settle terms, on which an absolute suspension of arms should be agreed to \*. Nobody ever doubted, that there was such an understanding between the French king and his grandson, that the former could oblige the latter to resign the Spanish monarchy whenever he pleased; since he had not only given it King PHILIP at first, but had hitherto supported him in it. Every thing about him was intirely French: the seizing of Spain and the West Indies was the point that occasioned the war; the restitution of them, when the negociation was set on foot, was always supposed; and the first thing settled in the preliminaries was, a perfect and intire cession of the whole Spanish monarchy to King CHARLES the Third, to be made within two months

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\* Bishop of Chichester, vol. iii. p. 96.

from the first of June following: and in case the Duke of ANJOU should not consent to the present convention, it is expressly covenanted by the fourth article, that his most Christian Majesty, and the rest of the contracting parties, should concert the proper measures for procuring the intire effect of it. What was to be understood by proper measures, both sides were content should not, then, be explained. All this was readily agreed to, and one would have thought, that the French meant in earnest, \* that PHILIP should immediately resign Spain to his competitor; but the means to secure, besides verbal engagements, the execution of this essential point, still remained unsettled; there seemed but one way to provide for it effectually, which was, to make this cession one of the conditions for continuing the suspension of arms, agreed to in the thirty-fourth article, to the conclusion of a general peace. This was done by the thirty-seventh article, which declares, that this suspension shall continue till a general peace is made, provided the French king executes, on his part, all that is promised in the foregoing articles, and the whole Spanish monarchy be restored † [renduë et cédée] to King CHARLES, as is agreed by those articles. This was the touchstone of his sincerity

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\* Bishop of Chichester, vol. iii. p. 97.

† Art. 37.



to perform what had readily been consented to by his plenipotentiaries, particularly with regard to the fundamental point, the restitution of the Spanish monarchy. Here they began to hesitate: they made great professions of the sincerity of their king's intentions;—that he would punctually execute all that depended upon him; and that he would endeavour to persuade his grandson to a compliance; but that to force him to it, and that in so short a time, would be out of his power; and therefore it was impossible for the king to consent to this article: and to consent to the rest of the preliminaries, unless an absolute suspension of arms was agreed to, would be to leave himself at the mercy of the allies. But to this it was easy to answer, that if the French king was in earnest in this matter, he might certainly recall his grandson without any difficulty; and provided he acted the fair part, and did all he could towards it (according to the fourth article) he might depend upon it the allies neither would, nor (considering the state of their alliances and the nature of some of their governments) could they, take an advantage of any words in the thirty-seventh article, to begin the war again upon him, when he had faithfully performed the other parts of it, and surrendered the places agreed to be delivered to them in the thirty-fifth article; that supposing what they objected to in this article

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ticle were not a pretended, but a real difficulty, the consequence then would be, that the allies must either trust to the sincerity of France, or France to that of the allies: as the French king, supposing it not in his power (which nobody could believe) to oblige the Duke of ANJOU to resign, would, by executing the rest of the treaty, be at the mercy of the allies; so on the other hand, if the allies made a peace with him without this article, they would be at his mercy for the recovery of the Spanish monarchy, which was the grand object for which they entered into the war.

THIS sudden tergiversation of the French, after all that had passed on that essential point of Spain, which had been the foundation of all the steps and conferences relative to peace, was very surprizing: for verbal agreements are of no consequence without ascertaining the means for a real execution of them: and the notorious breach of public faith by LEWIS the Fourteenth, on many occasions, made it not only prudent, but necessary, that the allies should take their precautions for the sure performance of what had been promised in an affair of so much consequence. The scandalous violation of the partition treaty almost as soon as made, and the usurpation of the Spanish monarchy, notwithstanding the most solemn



solemn and repeated renunciations of it, were too fresh in their memory to trust to the verbal assurances of those, by whom they had been so often deceived: but what gave a more than ordinary reason for jealousy and suspicion at this juncture, was, the causing the Prince of Asturias to be acknowledged presumptive heir of Spain by all states of the kingdom; which ceremony was performed with great solemnity on the seventh of April, about a month after M. ROUVILLÉ had been in Holland, who was suffered to come thither and confer with the Dutch Deputies; it being understood to be on this express condition, that Spain and the West Indies should be restored to the house of Austria. The French could make no reply to the just alarm that this proceeding in Spain had given the allies, but that their master was not answerable for what the Duke of ANJOU had done; for his own part he was sincere, and would do what depended upon him; and therefore if a peace was not concluded, it would not lay at his door\*.

THE allies, although they did not think what was urged had any truth in it (as is evident from what has been said before) yet, to shew how far they were from

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\* Bishop of Chichester, p. 104.

designing

designing to impose on the French king impossible conditions, thought of an expedient, which could not be refused without discovering that France meant nothing by this treaty, but to make peace for itself, and leave the allies involved in a war with the Duke of ANJOU for the recovery of Spain. They declared, that if it was not in the French king's power to oblige his grandson to retire out of Spain, they would be content with his doing what was evidently in his power, which was, to deliver up to them such places in the Spanish dominions, as were garrisoned by his own troops; but the Marquis DE TORCY, rather than accept of this expedient, agreed at last to let the thirty-seventh article stand as it is worded, and that the absolute suspension of arms should depend upon the restitution of the Spanish monarchy, with a reserve to know the French king's pleasure.

THE conferences at last ended: the preliminary articles were settled, reduced into a formal treaty, and collated in the presence of the French plenipotentiaries, with their verbal approbation of them; and they were immediately signed by those of the Emperor, England, and Holland, TORCY alledging as an excuse for his not signing them, that he had not precise orders relating to some of the articles. He left the Hague on the twenty-eighth



eighth of \* May, promising to send the French king's answer by the fourth of June ; which, from the necessity of that king's affairs, the point the treaty was carried to, the Marquis's rank, character, and personal merit, and the protestations he made of his master's sincerity, was hoped would be favourable, but most of all from his desiring the allies at parting, to hasten the ratification of the articles ; and he particularly pressed the Duke of MARLBOROUGH to dispatch an express without loss of time to England for that purpose, that the ratifications from thence might be soon at the Hague, to be exchanged with those from France ; and even publicly said (notwithstanding what is boldly advanced to the contrary by the author of the sketch) that he did not know but King PHILIP might be at Paris before him. This I can, my Lord, positively affirm to be true, who was at that time at the Hague secretary to the British embassy for negotiating the peace : and I beg leave to add, that when I carried over the preliminaries, and waited upon Lord GODOLPHIN with the Duke of MARLBOROUGH's dispatches to him ; his Lordship, who was a minister of great prudence, reserve, and caution, appeared, upon the

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\* 1709.

perusal of them, extremely pleased, and fully persuaded, that the preliminaries would be ratified by France; and all possible expedition was used in sending me back with the Queen's ratification of them.

It may not be improper here to observe, as a circumstance that seemed to corroborate the expectations of a peace, and the disposition of France to it, that, during the course of this negociation, the Marquis DE TORCY himself was the person who insisted, that no other title than that of Duke of ANJOU should be given to PHILIP, in the article where it was necessary to name him, saying, There ought to be but one king in France \*.

THE hopes which M. DE TORCY had left with the allies of the near conclusion of a good peace, had filled the world with a joy not to be expressed; they waited with great impatience for the fourth of June. The much-expected courier arrived the day after from Paris: M. ROUILLE, upon the receipt of his dispatches, acquainted the allies, that the French king would not agree to the preliminaries, and looked upon them as null and void.

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\* Lamberti, vol. v. p. 288.



THE articles, to which exception was taken, were the same that had been disputed in the conferences, \* those relating to the Emperor and the Duke of SAVOY, and the thirty-seventh article. The allies were not a little surprized at this answer, and more at the haughty air with which M. ROUILLE, in a long conference, pressed his objections. After having insisted upon them with much stiffness, he fixed a day for his departure; which had no other effect, than to dispose the States General to take immediately a resolution, declaring, † that, since the French had receded from the great advances they had made towards a general pacification, and that the departure of their minister could leave no room to come to a firm and lasting one, no time was to be lost to open the campaign, and push the war with all possible vigour.

THIS resolution disposed ROUILLE, before he left the Hague, to see the Pensionary again; and, as an instance of great sincerity and concern, that the treaty might not be broken off, he receded from all the other points he had before insisted upon, excepting that of the thirty-

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\* Bishop of Chichester, p. 105.

† Lamberti, vol. v. p. 297.

seventh article, making a great merit of his master's condescension in going so far, and so near towards a peace; flattering himself, as it was imagined, that the refusal of so specious an offer might incense the populace in the Dutch provinces, grown uneasy under their heavy taxes, against their ministers, for prolonging the war for the sake of one article only. He was disappointed in his expectations; the people understood perfectly well the artifice of France: the objections to the preliminaries were in appearance reduced to one article; but the substance of them all was, in effect, comprehended in it, as the execution of those of the greatest importance, and particularly that relating to Spain and the Indies, depended upon that one article.

THE restitution of that monarchy was the object of the war; was the cement of the treaties made for carrying it on; was the motive that induced the allies to agree to a negotiation for peace; was the condition accepted by France for the mission and admission of her ministers to negotiate; was the first specific article demanded by the allies, and agreed to by the French without hesitation, and at the first conference with them settled in the most explicit terms by several articles; and therefore the affectation of agreeing to all the other articles,



ticles, and objecting at the same time against the thirty-seventh, which contained the only possible means for carrying into execution the most essential points of the other articles (and particularly that fundamental one of yielding Spain and the West Indies) was the same thing as if they had rejected the whole treaty: for a verbal agreement, without securing a real execution of it, is no agreement at all, there being no difference between not promising a thing, and the evading, after having promised, the performance of it, besides the scandalous imputation of breach of faith; and consequently this seeming complaisance of the French king, in agreeing to all but one article, made no other impression upon peoples minds, than to raise the greatest indignation in Holland, and indeed universally, at such an illusive and perfidious behaviour, so unbecoming the dignity of a prince.

BUT, to state this negociation in one short and clear view:

PRELIMINARIES, after various conferences between the ministers of the allies and the prime minister of France, had been reduced, as it were, by common consent, into a treaty; the French minister indeed did not sign them, but he so far encouraged the allies to do it,

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as to desire at parting, that all possible diligence might be used in getting their ratifications dispatched, particularly those from England; promising that the approbation, and consequently the ratification of his master, should be sent in a few days. Instead of that approbation a haughty message comes, to declare this great work, of so much importance and expectation, for putting an end to a ruinous and expensive war, null; or, which is all one, that the French king would not agree to the only effectual means, contained in the thirty-seventh article, for carrying what had been stipulated in so solemn a manner into execution, by making the restitution of the Spanish monarchy, in two months, the condition of an absolute peace with France. Nor did his ministers propose, in rejecting this, any other expedient or equivalent to answer the same end. France had placed PHILIP upon the Spanish throne, and maintained him there; she was reduced to the necessity, for her own preservation, to negotiate the terms of a general pacification, by making PHILIP's resignation of that crown to King CHARLES the basis of the treaty: it was incumbent then upon her to secure the execution of that condition. The allies, seeing no other effectual way for that purpose, propose, that the absolute peace with France should depend upon the resignation being made in two months; not with an  
 air



air of insult, or with a view of laying a cruel hardship upon the French king, by limiting the performance of so great a point as that of dethroning his grandson (as was odiously given out) to so short a time; but because it was understood by the nature of this whole transaction, that it could be no difficult matter; and that he must have been able and prepared, if he was sincere, to get immediately done, what he had so readily and formally granted for the sake of peace; in which case two months would have been sufficient, and was as much time as could be reasonably allowed, considering how far the season was advanced, and how long the negotiation had already put off the opening of the campaign: had a longer time been granted, and the evacuation of Spain, under some pretence or other, been eluded at the expiration of it, the allies might have lost the opportunity of pursuing the conquests, which the superiority of their arms and their former successes gave them good reason to expect; and which they did indeed do, in the remainder of the year, as will be shewn hereafter, even beyond what they hoped, or the French apprehended.

Now if a separate peace had been made with France upon the foot of the preliminaries, without the thirty-seventh article; while the allies must have continued in  
war

war with PHILIP for the reduction of that monarchy (which must have been the case, if that article had been laid aside) it is not easy to conceive, how and when they would be able to drive him out of Spain; even supposing the French king should give him no assistance directly or indirectly; especially, as he not only refused to give the allies possession of the towns in Spain garrisoned by French troops, in order to facilitate the reduction of it, and as an expedient to avoid the cruel imposition of obliging himself to make war upon his grandson, but also took care, by withdrawing immediately his garrisons out of those places, and putting them into the hands of the Spaniards, to have an excuse for not doing it at all, by not having it in his power. This was so bad a symptom of the sincerity of his desire or intentions that Spain should be restored, that it justly alarmed the allies, and gave them too much reason to apprehend he would give the Duke of ANJOU all possible assistance underhand, to maintain him upon that throne; and that there could be no other effectual way to prevent that assistance, than to make, according to the thirty-seventh article, the continuation of the suspension of arms until the conclusion of a general peace, depend upon the restitution of the Spanish monarchy within the space of two months: no other security was offered, by authority, from France for restoring



restoring it, besides verbal assurances of the French king's endeavour to persuade PHILIP to resign, and to abandon him intirely, if he did not comply. This, sad experience had shewn, was in reality no security at all. France, as has been said before, had so perfidiously broke all treaties during the reign of LEWIS the Fourteenth, that, to depend on mere promises on his part, was a farce; and it would have been an inexcusable folly to expect he would have kept an agreement, which was of so much importance to him to break or evade. \* In the peace of the Pyrenées, where the interest of France was not so deeply engaged, to preserve Portugal from falling under the yoke of Castile, as it was now to preserve Spain in the hands of a grandson, after the French king had sworn to give no assistance to Portugal, yet, under pretence of breaking some corps, he suffered them to be entertained by the Portugal ambassador, and sent SCHOMBERG to command them; pretending, that he could not hinder one that was a German to go and serve wherever he pleased. Thus he made no difficulty to break his word and oath, where the considerations were not so strong as in the present case; and it was visible, that no faith

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\* Burnet, vol. ii. p. 528, 529.

which that king could pledge was to be relied on ; and if the allies were left to conquer Spain, whilst France was suffered to get out of the war, there could be no doubt but she, having nothing to fear for herself, would have recourse to her usual infidelity : and would the allies have been able to prevent the grandfather, in peace, from giving assistance to his grandson against his enemies ? if not openly, yet privately, by money and jewels, or by leaving French troops in Spain, under a notion of desertion, or of being detained upon some pretence by the Duke of ANJOU's order. How would it have been possible in such free governments as England and Holland, consisting of different parties, and labouring already under burdensome taxes, to continue at least the same expences, and maintain the same armies, as must still have been necessary to keep the French king in awe, and to conquer at the same time Spain ? Would it have been easy to settle plans, and the respective quotas among the confederates, for carrying on the war, at such a distance ? Would it have been easy, when the terms of peace were known, to have reconciled their different views and interests, and to have kept them united against the influence and intrigues of France, until the Spanish monarchy should be reduced ? These difficulties appear so obvious and insuperable, and are so fully and unanswerably set



set forth by the Bishop of Chichester, that I must beg leave, if you want farther conviction, to refer your Lordship to his third letter to a Tory member on this subject. In short, the granting an absolute peace to France, without a restitution of Spain and the West Indies, would have been the same thing as to abandon them intirely to the possession of the house of Bourbon; must have been a dissolution of the grand alliance, disappointed the motives and lost the fruits of so long, so expensive, and so glorious a war; and would have proved, as BURNET expresses it, a fatal delusion.

To conclude this head.—The union and steadiness of the allies defeated the French king's artful endeavours to divide or deceive them, and to procure a peace for himself, leaving them to conquer Spain as they could. However, as the severity of the weather made it impossible for his armies to take the field early, he gained time, and got the opening of the campaign put off by spinning out the negociation. By a plausible appearance of a disposition for peace, he not only quieted the minds of his people, whose clamours, from their miserable condition, had been loud; but he wrought them up to a zeal to support him, out of a resentment for the pretended indignity offered their monarch, to force him to take up

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arms against his grandson. VILLARS made him believe, that his army in Flanders was in a pretty good condition; that he was so posted, it was impossible to draw him out of his lines, or to force his intrenchments; that there was nothing to be apprehended, but the siege of one town, which would find the allies work enough for that year, as the season was so far spent: and therefore the French king, rather than abandon his grandson, put an end to the treaty, and determined to hazard another campaign — The events of which I shall now, as briefly as I can, lay before your Lordship.

\* IN Spain, the French General ASFELD took the castle of Alicant, and NOAILLES gained some advantage over a body of Austrian forces. The French general the Marquis DE BESONS refused to engage Count STAHR-REMBERG, and suffered him quietly to take Balaguer.

IN Portugal there was a battle on the frontier, in which the Portuguese behaved very ill. The Spaniards did not pursue the advantage they had by this action, but withdrew their troops from Portugal to defend their own



coast; being apprehensive, that our fleet might have a design upon some part of it. In Italy nothing of importance passed.

IN Germany (the Elector of Hanover being persuaded to take upon him the command of the confederate army) a project was formed to penetrate into Franche Comté; but Count MERCY, without staying for the junction of his Electoral Highness, advanced and attacked Count DUBOURG with a detachment much inferior to the French, and was defeated. The loss on both sides was thought to be equal, but the Germans were forced to repass the Rhine; which ended the campaign there.

THE chief scene of action was in Flanders, where the allies, having amused Marshal VILLARS with feint marches, unexpectedly invested \*, besieged, and took † the town of Tournay, and in less than a month after, that citadel, thought to be the strongest in Europe. They then resolved to besiege Mons; but it being necessary, in order to take that place, to attack the French army deeply intrenched, a bloody battle ensued; the allies

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\* July 3.

† July 30, 1709.

gained a complete victory, though the loss on both sides was near equal. The French retired to Valenciennes, and secured themselves in strong lines, leaving the allies to carry on the siege of \* Mons, and take it without giving them any disturbance, which put an end to a most glorious campaign, and soon after gave an occasion to the renewal of the negotiations for peace : of which an account shall be given in my next.

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\* Besieged Sept. 20, taken Oct. 20, 1709.

L E T T E R



## L E T T E R IX.

MY LORD,

AFTER ROUILLE's \* departure from the Hague, which put an end to the preliminary treaty, PETKUM was suffered to carry on a correspondence with TORCY, to try if an expedient could be found out for the thirty-seventh article; the difficulty in that article being the only point, in appearance, for which the conferences were broken off. The point they offered to satisfy the allies in was, that the French king would not directly nor indirectly assist his grandson: the expedient proposed to secure that point was the same with that which PETKUM had intimated, as from himself, the day before ROUILLE went away; viz. That three towns should be put into the hands of the allies, to be restored

\* June, 9.

to France when the affairs of Spain should be settled, or otherwise to be retained by them: which amounted to no more, than that France might be willing to lose three towns more, that PHILIP might keep Spain and the West Indies. However the allies, to shew their readiness to put an end to the war as soon as possible, with honour and safety, were willing to enter into an expedient of this kind, although the best that could be agreed to might still hazard the loss of that monarchy to the house of Austria: the places therefore ought to bear some equality to that for which they were given in pawn; but the answer made to every proposition of this sort shewed, they meant nothing but to amuse and distract the allies \*.

THE first demand made by the allies was, to have put into their possession the Spanish places that were then in the hands of the French king: the delivering up of these might have been a good step towards the reduction of that kingdom; but this was flatly refused, as has been said before; and that the French king might put it out of his power to treat about it, he ordered his troops to be drawn out of all the strong places in Spain, and soon after out of that kingdom. He would have had this pass

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\* Burnet, vol. ii. p. 549.



for an evacuation of it, although the French forces continued still in the neighbourhood; with what design is not difficult to guess. A shew truly was made of leaving Spain to defend itself; and PHILIP prevailed upon the Spaniards to make greater efforts than was ever expected from them: this was done by the French king, to deceive both the allies and his own subjects, who cried out loudly for peace; but while his troops were called out of that kingdom, as many deserted by a visible connivance, as made up several battalions. All the Walloon regiments, as being subjects of Spain, were sent thither; and in case of a peace, Marshal BERWICK, in the French service, was to be permitted to go and command in Spain: by this means King PHILIP was not weakened by the recall of the French troops, and the places in Spain could not be any more demanded of France; she pretended indeed to be sincere and desirous to remove all difficulties in the way of peace, but at the same time, and by the same action, increased the difficulties she would seem to remove, by rendering the most reasonable proposals of the allies for that purpose impracticable; and afterwards complained of the allies for insisting upon means for the reduction of Spain, which were not in the power of France to comply with, while she herself took care to create that impossibility.

THE next expedient, as the most important towards the reduction of Spain, was, that Bayonne and Perpignan, French towns on the frontier of Spain, might be put into the hands of the allies, which would cut off all communication between France and Spain, and might enable the allies to send forces thither with less expence and trouble, in a shorter time. This was an expedient which the French king could not say was out of his power to comply with; but it was said, it suited not with the dignity of that monarch, nor the safety of his subjects, to put the keys of his kingdom into the hands of the allies, not knowing what use they might make of them, or when he should have them again: this was arguing very right for a man who never intended that should be done, which is made the condition on which the caution he deposits shall be restored.

IN short, by these and such like evasions it appeared, that the French did not care to pledge any of their towns, but such as might be easily taken, or they could be willing to part with for good and all, as a trifling consideration for securing effectually the monarchy of Spain to the house of Bourbon: and therefore they would give no security but what, if accepted, they designed to forfeit, by not doing, or suffering to be done, what would give them a right to demand it again. ON



ON the side of the Emperor, Thionville was refused; they seemed disposed to give some cautionary towns in the Netherlands, but Douay, Arras, and Cambray, which were of most consequence, and might lay them open to the invasion of the allies, were excepted. A sure indication that the French king would do nothing that might lay him under a necessity to oblige his grandson to restore Spain and the West Indies, which nobody could doubt of his having in his power, if he would set earnestly about it: so that all the offers on the part of France appearing illusory, these negociations by letters came to nothing, and were dropped for some time, as one side never proposed what the other could accept; unless the allies would be content with the name of an expedient, instead of the thing, and take that for a security, which they were sure beforehand could by no means answer the end for which it was given.

\* WHILE these negociations were carrying on by letters, the Duke of ANJOU did not only take all the proper measures he could, to sustain himself in the monarchy which his grandfather, in appearance, was treating to

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\* Bishop of Chichester's fourth letter, p. 148, 149, 150.

give up, but published a manifesto, protesting against all that should be done at the Hague to his prejudice; declaring he would adhere to his faithful subjects: he also appointed plenipotentiaries in his name, who gave the States notice of their powers and instructions; and in a letter to the Duke of MARLBOROUGH, intimations how grateful King PHILIP would be, if, by the means of his Grace's good offices, his desires might be complied with; but no answer was given to this letter, or notice taken of it.

HOWEVER, some time after, the States, to shew their readiness to hearken to any reasonable proposal for removing the difficulties that obstructed the conclusion of peace, permitted PETKUM, at the request of M. TORCY, to go to France to try if his presence could help to find out an expedient, which had been in vain attempted by letters.

AFTER some stay there, \* he returned to the Hague, without bringing so much as the pretence of an expedient for the thirty-seventh article, the object of his journey; but instead of that, † brought the sense of the French

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\* Dec. 6, 1709.

† Lamberti, vol. v. p. 314—317.  
court,



court, in a \* paper dictated by M. Torcy, proposing that, without any farther talk of the preliminary articles, the winter months might be employed in negotiating a definitive peace; that suppressing the form of these articles, the French king was willing to keep the substance of them; to treat upon the foundation of the concession made in them to the allies, and to name plenipotentiaries for that purpose. It was evident at the first view, that this scheme overturned all the preliminaries at once, giving an intire liberty to dispute every point afresh, though the French king had pretended to agree to all of them, excepting one article. † The assurance of the French must be wonderful, in conceiving that they could impose upon the allies, especially in their glorious situation, with new captious distinctions; that which had formerly been made between the spirit and the letter in the partition treaty, was too well remembered for them to be deceived by quirks of the same kind, such, as a distinction between the form and the substance. If this could have passed upon them, the form of these articles would soon have been found to be the substance of them, and the pretended substance would prove a shadow only.

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\* Dated Nov. 27, 1709.

† Bishop of Chichester's fourth letter, p. 150—153.

THE States having, in concert with the ministers of the principal allies, considered, that the French king had approved, and constantly declared his readiness to conform to all the other articles of the preliminaries, if an expedient could be agreed upon to remove the difficulties of the thirty-seventh; and that to procure such an expedient was the only motive and foundation of PETKUM's journey to Paris; and that the proposal he had brought was so far from any thing of that kind, that it was a total subversion of all the preliminaries; it was unanimously agreed and publicly declared not to be satisfactory; and \* it was resolved to insist upon the preliminary articles and the execution of them, before the conclusion of a definitive treaty. How prudent and necessary this resolution was, soon appeared by a fresh instance of French duplicity: that king, about the time that PETKUM returned from Paris, let the Duke of ANJOU know, that he need not be alarmed at the recalling of the French troops; that he would never abandon him; and that he had ordered twelve battalions, then in Spain, to join the Spaniards, in case King CHARLES should make an irruption in Arragon †.

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\* Resolution of the States, Dec. 14, 1709. Lamberti, vol. v. p. 316.

† Bishop of Chichester's fourth letter, p. 153, 154.



THE French court, by the unanimity of the allies, were disappointed in their aim to create divisions and jealousies between them, for which this new and extraordinary proposal was plainly calculated.

FOR some time after this, there was a pause in the negotiations for peace, when an express brought a fresh \* project from France : it was an amplification of the last, and cast the preliminaries into a new form. Besides several material alterations, there was only a bare promise for the restitution of Spain and the West Indies : the clause in the fourth article, by which the French king is to take proper measures to oblige his grandson to quit that monarchy, is left out. The restoration of the two Electors is insisted upon, and that of the Elector of Bavaria, in particular, to the upper palatinate, in contradiction to the preliminaries, by which it was agreed, that it should remain to the Elector Palatine. The expedient for the thirty-seventh article is, towns in Flanders of the French king's own choosing : the execution of all the articles is to be deferred, until the conclusion of the treaty and the exchange of the ratifications.

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\* Lamberti, vol. vi. p. 13.  
Bishop of Chichester's fourth letter, p. 155.

THUS

THUS again the two great ends of a preliminary treaty, which are to agree to some fundamental points, and secure the execution of them, before the conclusion of a general peace, are utterly destroyed; and the French king, as if this proposal had been an act of grace, declares himself free from all engagements, if it be not accepted\*.

As this scheme was in effect the same with the paper brought by ПЕТКУМ, and France had all along excepted to nothing but the thirty-seventh article, the allies determined to adhere to the rest, and admit of no conferences, until France should explain herself fully on that point; and let her know, that they should not decline to treat upon an equivalent for the thirty-seventh article, if she admitted the rest of the preliminaries; to which they required a precise answer: an account of which I shall lay before your Lordship in my next letter.

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\* Bishop of Chichester's fourth letter, p. 107.



## LETTER X.

MY LORD,

THE steadiness on the part of the allies mentioned in my last, brought another \* message from Paris, signifying, that the French king agreed to all the preliminaries but the thirty-seventh article; and if the allies would consent, that his ministers should come into Holland, and confer upon that article, he did not doubt, but what should be proposed would be to their satisfaction. This was so full a declaration, as gave some hopes that this difficulty, which appeared to be the only one, might be adjusted; and therefore the States sent † passports: but foreseeing the bad effects of suffering the French ministers to come into the heart of their country, they ap-

\* Feb. 1710. Bishop of Chichester's fourth letter, p. 157, 158.

† Feb. 23, 1710.

pointed Gertruydenberg to be the place where the Marshal D'HUXELLES and the Abbot POLIGNAC should meet the Dutch Deputies, Mess. BUYS and VANDER DUSSEN. They met, and had the first \* conferences at Moerdyck.

† THE French plenipotentiaries endeavoured to shew, that it was the interest of the allies to make a separate peace with France, exclusive of Spain; that the French king would enter into the most solemn engagements, to remove all suspicion of his giving his grandson any assistance, and would pledge towns as a security for performing his promise. The Deputies could not forbear expressing their surprize at nothing being offered, but a repetition of what had been already rejected. The French ministers said, their master would never be brought to declare war against his grandson; and therefore there was no other way to procure the Spanish monarchy for the Arch-duke, than by giving a part of it to PHILIP: that if the allies would consent to leave him Naples and Sicily, he might be engaged to resign the rest to the Arch-duke. The Deputies replied, that such a partition was incompatible with the treaties which the allies had made

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\* March 9, 1710.

† Lamberti, vol. vi. p. 16.



with one another, as well as with the whole tenour of the preliminary articles, acknowledged by the French themselves to be the foundation of the treaty: that they were come to hear what equivalent they had to propose, in lieu of the thirty-seventh article, which was the only one that had been objected to, and not to debate any other point. The plenipotentiaries desired to send a courier to France for farther instructions. From this time couriers passed and repassed between Gertruydenberg and the Hague: frequent conferences were held between the French Plenipotentiaries and the Dutch Deputies: PET-KUM was employed in several messages backwards and forwards: but for a minute detail of all that passed in this famous negociation, which lasted from the beginning of March to the twenty-third of July, when the French suddenly broke it off, I must beg leave to refer your Lordship to the \* authors that then lived, and have wrote fully on that subject; and I shall give you, as briefly as I can, the substance of the proposals made at different times on the part of the French, and of the answers returned on the part of the allies.

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\* Lamberti. Bishop of Chichester. Burnet.

\* THAT of a separate treaty between France and the allies, exclusive of Spain, was again renewed, and again refused. They then demanded Naples and Sicily for PHILIP; if that did not please the allies, they should let him have the kingdom of Arragon: if that was not liked, he would be content with Naples, Sardinia, and the Spanish places upon the coast of Tuscany.

† In the next conference they give up Sicily and Sardinia, and fix upon Naples, with the places upon the coast of Tuscany, or the kingdom of Arragon. They insist upon these alternatives for a considerable time; and in ‡ another conference which they desired to have with the Deputies, would not depart from them. However they desist from Naples, and PHILIP will be satisfied with Sicily and Sardinia, and the places upon the coast of Tuscany ||.

§ At last they recede from the places upon the coast of Tuscany, and will be contented with Sicily and Sar-

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\* March 21, 22. Second Conference. Lamberti, vol. vi. p. 40, 41.

† April 7, 8. Third Conference. Lamberti, vol. vi. p. 50.

‡ April 24. Fourth Conference. Lamberti, vol. vi. p. 62.

|| Lamberti, vol. vi. p. 56, 57.

§ May 24, 25. Fifth Conference.



dinia; desiring at the same time, that what farther demands the allies had to make, and especially the Empire, might be specified.

NOTHING could be more directly against the preliminaries, than the proposal of a partition; but the allies were willing to give something for a general peace, and the Deputies never rejected that method to come at it. The French having greatly retrenched their first demands, they were at last, as they had often been, but now in a more peremptory manner, asked, supposing a partition was agreed to, and that Sicily and Sardinia should be given to King PHILIP, which way the French king proposed to secure the rest of the Spanish monarchy to King CHARLES \*. As the reason why the allies insisted on the thirty-seventh article was, that they might have a general peace, and not be involved in a separate war with Spain; this was the business of these conferences; and there could be no sense in pretending to demand a partition upon any other terms, than, that if the allies should give up one part of that monarchy to the Duke of ANJOU, he should resign the rest to King CHARLES. It must be presumed, that the grandfather knew the grand-

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\* Bishop of Chichester's fourth letter, p. 168.

son's mind upon this head, and that he had authority from him to treat of a partition, or that he himself had the power in his hands to oblige him to consent to it. The answer was, that he was willing to concert measures with the allies according to the fourth article: but this could by no means be sufficient; it was inconsistent with a general peace, which the allies had constantly insisted upon, and would necessarily engage them in a Spanish war, which they had been treating of a partition to prevent.

BUT, to understand the meaning of the French more distinctly, the Deputies desired to know, what those measures were? And here insuperable difficulties were started, about the number of troops to be employed to reduce Spain and the West Indies; what share each should contribute; how they should act, whether jointly or separately; who should command, and by whom the instructions for acting should be formed for the operations both by sea and land\*; which plainly shewed, that the execution of the measures would prove impracticable. To remove these objections the French plenipotentiaries said, if the Duke of ANJOY would not be

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\* Bishop of Chichester's fourth letter, p. 155.

persuaded



persuaded to quit Spain, a sum of money should be annually paid by France towards the expence the allies should be at, during the war, to reduce Spain and the West Indies. Here new difficulties arose, first in settling the sum and securing the payment: the security of the richest bankers in Paris was offered: but what remedy could the allies have against these bankers, in case of failure? or how could they come at them, who must all break whenever the French king had a mind they should\*.

It was plain it was to no purpose to think of concerting measures for pursuing the war with Spain, after peace should be made with France. What had been said about troops and money, evidently shewed, nothing of that kind could be imagined, which France would not be able to defeat by the difficulties with which she would take care to puzzle it. All proposals of this nature were not only contrary to the thing designed by the preliminaries, which was a general peace, but also contrary to what was declared by the French to be their meaning in proposing a partition; which was, that the Spanish monarchy should be effectually given up to King

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\* Bishop of Chichester's fourth letter, p. 169—173.

CHARLES, some part being taken out of it for the benefit of PHILIP; and if there really were need of force to compel the Duke of ANJOU, which was not at all probable, it ought to lay wholly on the French king, who had from the beginning promised the restitution of Spain and the West Indies, and laid it down as the foundation for treating; which left no room to doubt, but that he knew he could oblige his grandson to consent to it: otherwise such a promise could be made with no other view than to amuse and impose upon the allies. However, if force was necessary, the allies were willing the troops they had in Portugal and Catalonia should act in concert with the French king's to obtain this end, within the two months, or such other limited time as should be agreed on. And whoever considers the Duke of ANJOU's dependance on France, will easily be satisfied, that if she was sincere, and in earnest meant what her ministers constantly professed, a small force, and a very little time, would be more than enough.

UPON these considerations, the allies resolved to reject the offer of money that had been made, because it supposed a particular peace with France, and the continuation of the war with Spain, and to demand of the French to explain themselves upon the subject of the evacuation  
of



of Spain and the West Indies, in favour of King CHARLES, agreeably to the preliminaries; which being complied with, the allies would declare their intention with respect to the partition, and would facilitate the means to finish the rest, and bring the whole to a good conclusion; and that unless France did this, all farther conferences could be to no purpose.

\* THIS resolution being communicated to the French plenipotentiaries, they were pleased to call such a peremptory summons to explain themselves, a formal rupture of the treaty; and upon the return of an express they sent to Versailles, which staid but a very little time, they † write a very long letter to the Pensionary in the form of a manifesto, and leave Gertruydenberg themselves the twenty-fifth of July.

To put the conduct of the French in one short view :

A PRELIMINARY treaty for peace is negociated at the Hague between ministers on the part of the allies and on the part of France : the restitution of the Spanish mon-

\* July 8, 1710.

Z † July 20, 1710.

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archy to King CHARLES is stipulated in the most express terms.

THIS treaty is signed by the allies, without any objection by the French, except to the method proposed in the thirty-seventh article, for securing the execution of it in a certain manner and in a certain time.

AT the desire of France, negotiations are frequently renewed in different shapes, professedly, only to find an expedient for that article, upon repeated assurances of her agreeing to all the rest.

VARIOUS expedients are suggested and refused, being either impracticable or ineffectual, or tending to hold the allies engaged in a particular war with Spain, while France would enjoy the benefits of peace.

To put an end to all difficulties the French declare, the only way to procure the Spanish monarchy to King CHARLES, is to give a part of it to PHILIP; which, after several proposals, they reduce and fix to Sicily and Sardinia.



THE allies make no objection to this expedient, but desire to know, in case it should be accepted, whether the French would then sign and execute the preliminary articles, and how the restitution of Spain and the West Indies should be secured.

THE French take this reasonable demand very ill, and cry out loudly against it, as a design on the part of the allies to break off the conferences; although the proposal of Sicily and Sardinia in favour of PHILIP could not possibly have any other meaning, than to remove the pretended difficulty of evacuating Spain and the West Indies in favour of King CHARLES. In short, the French desire the allies to quit part of what the preliminaries give them for the sake of the rest, and are very angry, if they are asked, which way the rest is to be had. They fix upon a partition, and because the allies would be secured of having what the French themselves declared should be the effect and consideration of that partition, if agreed to, they abruptly put an end to the negotiation. Can any thing, my Lord, be more unjust, more absurd, and indeed more ridiculous, than this way of proceeding?

AFTER what has been so fully discussed relating to this negociation, it would be unnecessary to trouble your Lordship with the letter of the plenipotentiaries to the Pensionary at length; but to satisfy your curiosity, you may find it in \* Lamberti; and I am persuaded you will agree with me, that instead of being a true and natural exposition of what passed in the conferences at Gertruydenberg, it is a gross misrepresentation of facts, unsupported by reason, conceived in odious and angry expressions, with cruel and unjust reproaches, in return for the direct and candid behaviour of the Dutch Deputies, though set forth with all the art of a French writer and of a dexterous minister †.

BUT if your Lordship thinks it worth your while to read that fallacious libel, I must beg you will also cast your eye upon the ‡ resolution of the States of the twenty-seventh of July in answer to it. It is written with that plainness and sincerity, it is so free from disguise and artifice, there is in it such solid reasoning, so much good sense, such a force of truth, that a man must

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\* Lamberti, vol. vi. p. 60.

† Bishop of Chichester's fourth letter, p. 174.

‡ Lamberti, vol. vi. p. 65.



be a very bad judge, or, like the author of the sketch, have no very honest heart, who cannot see, or will not own, that the integrity and honour of the allies is abundantly justified and cleared from the false aspersions, which the French would throw upon them; and that the bad success of the negociations, however they may labour to fix it elsewhere, is intirely owing to themselves; it being exceeding evident, that the French king put it out of the power of the allies to make a general peace, by refusing to give them Spain and the West Indies; without which a good peace could never be made to answer the end for which the war was undertaken, and to reap the fruits of the great advantages they had obtained by it.—The more this affair is examined into, the more you will be convinced of the insincerity of the French, and the necessity the allies were under to act as they did.

YOUR Lordship perhaps may wonder, that a negotiation should continue above four months to debate and decide one single point, which might as easily have been decided in as many weeks: but you must consider, that LEWIS the Fourteenth had taken possession of the whole Spanish monarchy in favour of his grandson, had maintained him in it by force, against the joint efforts of the  
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most considerable powers in Europe: unaccustomed till this war, not to conquer in the field; and in negociations for peace, not to dictate the conditions of the treaty; his pride impatiently bore the cruel reverse of fortune in military operations; and rather than suffer Spain and the West Indies, the great object of all his views and actions for above fifty years, to be torn from his family, had recourse to all imaginable tricks and shifts, endeavouring to preserve, by dint of negociation, what he could not save, without the hazard of his own dominions, by dint of arms. For this reason, he sent and kept his ministers so long at Gertruydenberg, to treat with the Dutch Deputies, and renewed the conferences so often with many captious proposals, tending either to procure a separate peace for himself, while the allies should continue in a war with Spain; or to dissolve the grand alliance, by creating, if possible, disputes, jealousies, and divisions among the confederates about the acceptance or refusal of the offers: while he amused his own miserable subjects by prolonging the conferences, and made them easy with the hopes of an approaching peace, his emissaries scattered industriously abroad artful insinuations to make the free people of England and Holland uneasy, as if the English ministry and the Pensionary, with their friends, had a design to perpetuate a war for their own interests.

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Had any of these dangerous schemes taken place, all things must (as they did afterwards, by such means prevailing) have run into the utmost confusion; and notwithstanding the many victories and great progress of the confederate forces in the Low Countries against France, all hopes of recovering Spain and the West Indies from the house of Bourbon must have been lost. The prudence and patience of the States in not sending away the French plenipotentiaries, the steadiness and union of the allies in not being caught by insidious offers, exhausted and disappointed the resources of French policy and craft; which proved as weak and unsuccessful in the art of negotiating during these conferences, as their arms had done during this war in that of fighting.

THE allies were extremely desirous, as appeared by their readiness and disposition in treating, to put an end to the war upon safe and honourable terms; but the prospect or rumours of peace did not slacken their preparations for an early and vigorous campaign. The Duke of MARLBOROUGH, as soon as he \* took the field, in spite of the gasconades made by VILLARS of the bravery of his troops, and their eagerness to come to an

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\* April 10, 1710.

engagement, passed their strong lines, and besieged and \* took Douay and Fort Escarp without opposition, while the conferences were still depending; which made the injurious and insolent letter written to the Pensionary by the French plenipotentiaries, to put an end to them, very surprizing.

Two days after they had left Gertruydenberg, the Duke of ANJOU received a considerable disgrace at Almenara, and in about three weeks after that, his whole army was intirely † defeated at Saragossa, beyond a possibility of maintaining his ground in Spain without the assistance of France. The desperate condition of that prince's affairs, the important conquests which the Duke of MARLBOROUGH had already made of towns in the Low Countries, more than what was stipulated to be yielded by the preliminary treaty, and the probability of his carrying them still farther this year (as he did by taking Bethune, St. Vincent, and Aire) into the dominions of France, raised the expectation of every body, that the French king, unable to retrieve both his own and his grandson's affairs, rather than be ruined himself, would have persuaded or obliged PHILIP to agree to the

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\* June 15, 1710.

† Aug. 20, 1710.



restitution of Spain and the West Indies, for Sicily and Sardinia; which there is no doubt but the allies would have accepted, although not without some reluctance from the court of Vienna. But the French made no advances of that nature; not a word of peace and sincerity, or of a desire to put a stop to the effusion of Christian blood, was heard from Paris, directly or indirectly; nay, in some instances they put on as imperious an air, as if the affairs of France and Spain had been in a most flourishing state: PETKUM received letters from M. TORCY in that stile. This unaccountable behaviour did not want an explanation long; and even the Abbot POLIGNAC pointed at the meaning of it in a few words the day before he left Holland: when he was told by a person surprized at their breaking off the conferences so abruptly, that the Duke of MARLBOROUGH would be able to carry his arms into the heart of France, he replied coolly, “Ce que nous perdrons en Flanders, nous gagnerons en Angleterre;” What we shall lose in Flanders, we shall gain in England: which shall be more fully explained in my next.

J E T B R



## LETTER XI.

MY LORD,

THE Abbot POLIGNAC was not, and indeed could not well be mistaken in the reason he gave for breaking off the negociation. What he said was foreseen and foretold by those that were at all conversant at our court ; and consequently the French could not be ignorant of the precarious state of affairs there : they had friends enough to acquaint them with it.

THAT they would seriously have thought of peace, if nothing of this kind had happened, cannot be certainly affirmed ; but suppose them (and there is large room for the supposition) to have been at this time disposed to it, under the apprehension that after their many fruitless chicanes and vain attempts to deceive and divide the allies, there was no way left to save their country,

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but by a peace; yet, from the instant they had notice of the alterations made here, and such others as were then probable, and soon after actually followed, would not any step of theirs towards it have been grossly impolitic?

THEY must have been void of common sense (and the French are no fools) if from the apparent advantages with which they might flatter themselves by a change, which was already begun in the English administration, they had not suspended their pacific intentions, and, notwithstanding their daily losses, waited to see the events of intrigues that were then visibly carrying on at St. James's: especially as the Queen's aversion to the Duchess of MARLBOROUGH, and her strong inclinations in favour of another person, were no longer a secret. This misunderstanding between her Majesty and her Grace was the original source of the political convulsions in England, and soon after in Europe. I shall give your Lordship a sketch of that unhappy anecdote. Her Grace's familiar intimacy with the Queen from their tender ages, had gained her such an affection and ascendant in her Majesty's heart, as to have the absolute direction of her royal will and actions, both public and private, for many years.

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At last, by some unaccountable fatality, whether intoxicated by riches or pride, the Duchess seemed to grow weary of a constant attendance upon her fond and obedient mistress, and to look upon her high and envied station as a drudgery, rather than a benefit and honour. Surfeited with power and with the royal favour, and for her own ease and relief, she introduced a bedchamber-woman, her near relation, into the same free access to the Queen's presence, as she herself had enjoyed; vainly imagining (a surprizing thing in one of her understanding, education, and experience at court) that though she frequently neglected her own usual attendance, she might still preserve the same affection and authority with the Queen, and depute another to perform the engaging offices of a personal confidence, by which that affection and authority were acquired, and must be maintained; or that she could depend upon her faithful deputy to be content with the troublesome duty of a constant and close waiting, and not lay hold of and improve the obvious advantages of so favourable a situation to her own benefit. The bedchamber-woman had learnt the arts of court; the temptation was too great, the object too glorious and striking to be resisted: she studied and observed her Majesty's temper with so much attention and address as to get full possession of her heart, and to leave

no room there for a discarded rival. Mr. HARLEY at that time happened to be secretary of state, who had the same obligation for his high station to Lord MARLBOROUGH and Lord GODOLPHIN, as \* Mrs. HILL had to the Duchess for the Queen's favour and confidence.

MR. HARLEY was conversant in parliamentary forms and proceedings and in old records; appeared learned by being mysterious; had no genius for business, but to puzzle and perplex it; had great ambition, but no capacity to gratify it, unless by intrigues and the weakness of others: he was also related to Mrs. HILL. Fellow-servants in the same court, with the same views and of the same principles, soon joined in a close intimacy and correspondence. Frequent access to the closet by their offices gave them opportunities to whisper and inculcate such notions into the Queen, as they had previously concerted for their own ends, and to the disadvantage of the absent Duchess. Her Grace's behaviour furnished them with materials for that purpose: she had too long thought herself secure, and shewed no jealousy of the favour bestowed on a person she had raised. The discovery of her substitute's infidelity, when it was too late, flung her

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\* Mrs. Masham.



into resentments, violent and indiscreet, against one she had raised from nothing, which gave greater offence to the royal mistress, than to the new favourite servant. Her expostulations with the Queen herself, when she perceived her credit declining, were more passionate than became a subject towards a sovereign, that had been so bountiful to her and her family. It is said, that enraged at some refusal in the closet, she clapt-to the door when she went out with such a fury in the Queen's face, that the noise echoed through the whole apartment, which served only to increase her Majesty's displeasure towards her Grace, and to strengthen the hands of her enemies; who, from her impetuosity, daily gained more favour, and grew more sanguine and enterprizing. The Duke of MARLBOROUGH and Earl GODOLPHIN's inseparable connection with the Duchess, and their grateful attachment to her person, by obligations as well as alliance, was such an impediment in the way of the new projector, that he found it absolutely necessary to discontent and disgrace them, in order to compass his aspiring views. To attack and displace two such great men, fortified with such innumerable friends and universal fame, by their long and faithful services to their Queen and Country, and indeed for the liberties of Europe, was a bold undertaking: however it must be attempted; his  
new

new system of power could not be carried on, nor could he prevent his own downfall without it.

He depended upon Mrs. MASHAM's credit at court, and she upon his crafty counsels: thus associated, they resolved to lay siege to the administration: they broke ground at first covertly and with caution, and worked, as it were by sap, to undermine gradually the Queen's good opinion of those who had conducted her affairs with great glory and success. Her Majesty's dislike to the Duchess was masked with great dissimulation for some time, with respect to the government, as if no change of the ministry and measures was intended by it; but the new confederacy soon persuaded her to nominate, as of her own mere motion, such persons to vacant employments, as were no friends to the ministers, without their advice or participation, knowing that it must create a heart-burning in those who used to recommend to places; which is the test of credit at court; and knowing also, how to make a proper advantage of the uneasiness shewn at her Majesty's taking upon her to act by her own authority, and to be (for that was the cant word) truly Queen; although she was no more Queen than before; nor was there any other difference, than that the power in disposal of offices was, with her Majesty's affection, transferred



transferred from the Ducheſs of MARLBOROUGH to Mrs. MASHAM.

SUCH viſible evidence of a new bias and growing influence at court, and the daily mortifications which the wiſe Treafurer and the brave General met with, by the prevailing credit of thoſe who had no reputation or merit, made it impoſſible for them to fit in council with a Secretary of State whom they found conſtantly engaged in dark and dangerous intrigues againſt them. The oppoſition grew ſo great, that to act in confidence with him was irreconcilable to common prudence; and to renew a good underſtanding between them, conſidering how wide the breach was, and the circumſtances of it, exceeded all reaſonable expectation.

THE conſteſt for power became ſerious and public: HARLEY, thinking it neither ſeaſonable nor ſafe to ſtand it out, as the parliament and nation were then diſpoſed, and apprehending ſome attack upon the new favourite Lady, was obliged to retire from court, with the chief of his faction, not without hopes of returning with ſuperior force.

THEY had left a true and powerful friend behind them, with whom they continued to concert their dangerous designs in secret. They were not idle in their retirement; they formed a coalition with the Tories, and the professed enemies of the government: popular discontents on various pretences were fomented underhand; at last the impeachment, by the Commons, of a seditious preacher of doctrines which tended to subvert the principles of the Revolution and the Protestant Succession; and the lenity of his punishment by the judgment of the Lords, supposed to proceed from the Queen's private inclination and influence, raised a ferment and outcry in the whole nation, as if Religion and the established Church were in danger. Addresses were procured from several parts of the kingdom, with intimation of hopes that the Parliament would be dissolved, and with assurances of choosing at a new election such as should be faithful to the Crown and zealous for the Church.

MATTERS began now to ripen, and to be sufficiently prepared to shew publicly a new influence at court, and an intention to alter the administration.



THE Queen \* wrote to the Duke of MARLBOROUGH, without any previous notice to his Grace, to give Mr. HILL, a young officer, a vacant regiment, over the heads of many others of higher rank and long service: he had no other merit than that of being brother to the new favourite, who was known to be in a league with HARLEY to discredit his Grace.

THE Duke of SHREWSBURY's principles, after he had been at Rome and married an Italian Lady, were doubtful and suspected: he left the Whigs in every vote at Dr. SACHEVEREL's trial, and was suddenly † made lord chamberlain.

THE Queen by a letter acquainted Lord GODOLPHIN with her intentions; but she gave his Grace the staff before she could receive an answer from his Lordship.

THE Earl of SUNDERLAND was ‡ removed from being secretary of state. The Duke of MARLBOROUGH represented to the Queen, in a very moving letter, the bad consequences the disgrace of his son-in-law might

\* Jan. 1710.

† April 13, 1710.

‡ June 14, 1710.

bring upon the affairs of Europe, to no purpose: that near relation to his Grace was the chief motive for his Lordship's removal. It was made an article in the Paris Gazette, with a particular remark, that he was the Duke's son-in-law. At the same time the feuds and contests between the two parties were displayed in other French news-papers with an air of triumph. In the heat of these civil commotions in England, the French suddenly \* broke off the negociations at Gertruydenberg, and I dare say your Lordship does not wonder at it, nor at their doing it with so much insolence and haughtiness, as if they had gained a victory. They seemed not at all affected with the progress the allies had made toward the frontiers of France, by the taking of Douay, Bethune, and Aire; nor with the desperate condition of PHILIP's affairs, by the battles of Almenara and Saragossa. Our divisions, and the benefits they looked for from them, were objects of greater moment, employed their thoughts with pleasure, and made their own misfortunes sit easy upon them. Far from abandoning the Duke of ANJOU, which in his distressed situation must have secured to King CHARLES the possession of Spain, they sent him

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\* July 20, 1710.



new succours, and the Duke of VENDOSME, the best general they had, to command his army.

THEIR spirits were elated with the hopes they constantly received from their friends in England of their gaining ground there; and their hopes were soon fully answered.

\* EARL GODOLPHIN had shewn such a particular affection and zeal for her Majesty, that he studied to possess all people with a personal respect for her. He had discharged the great office of lord high treasurer, and supported the public credit, in a disinterested manner, with great honour for many years; and he was † dismissed from that station the very day after the Queen had expressed to him her desire that he would continue in her service.

THE Bishop of Chichester gives such an ingenious and prophetic description of this famous conjuncture, that I cannot forbear inserting the paragraph ‡.

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\* Burnet.

† Aug. 8, 1710.

‡ Fourth letter to a Tory member. Jan. 10-21, 1710-11.

“ THEY have a political observatory at Paris, where  
 “ the Marquis DE TORCY and the French ministers fre-  
 “ quently examine what appearances there are in the  
 “ heavens of all the countries at war with them; and  
 “ according to these they take their measures of war and  
 “ peace, and it is by this they justify their assisting the  
 “ Duke of ANJOU. \* What passed in Spain the twen-  
 “ tieth of August, they thought sufficiently balanced by  
 “ † what happened north-west of them the nineteenth.  
 “ —What preceded that phenomenon, and has since  
 “ followed it, has determined the French, not only to  
 “ support the Duke of ANJOU, but to desist for the  
 “ present from all farther offers of peace; by which we  
 “ are as much plunged into the war as we were seven  
 “ years ago, and there seems no remedy for it, but what  
 “ is worse than the disease, a bad peace: for the truth  
 “ of which (adds the Bishop) I shall refer you to your  
 “ own reflections upon all the news we have had these  
 “ four months from Paris; but what is as good a proof  
 “ as all the rest, to a letter of the Elector of Bavaria’s  
 “ minister to his master.”

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\* The battle of Saragossa, where Philip’s army was intirely routed.

† The removal of Lord Godolphin, 8-19.



THIS is so remarkable a piece, and so much to the present purpose, that I must trouble your Lordship with an extract of some clauses in it \*.

“ THE French king has received certain advice to-day, that the Parliament of England is dissolved, and that the changes designed in the ministry will be made: his majesty did not defer one moment to give me notice of it, that I might acquaint your Electoral Highness with it.

“ IT is certain, that the proclamation for a new Parliament, and the general change of the ministry, will give great uneasiness to the Dutch, and make them think of peace; but this the French court will not give into.

“ THERE is no doubt also, but the Duke of MARLBOROUGH will quit the command of the army; the rather, because the prevailing party will leave him unprovided of every thing, in order to force him to it.

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\* The Elector of Bavaria's minister's letter to his master. Versailles, Oct. 18, 1710.—Lamberti, vol. vi. p. 85. 1710.

“ THE court is of opinion, that the opportunity is  
 “ now come ; that good use ought to be made of this  
 “ favourable conjuncture, it being impossible that the  
 “ allies should continue united, after what we have now  
 “ seen in England.”

THIS letter unfortunately soon got abroad, and caused  
 such a general alarm, that the new faction in England  
 endeavoured to persuade the world it was a malicious in-  
 vention of the Whigs, and not genuine : but the editor  
 of the late Lord BOLINGBROKE's works has assured me  
 he has the original in his possession.

YOUR Lordship will, I do not doubt, make one natu-  
 ral inference from it ; which is, that the ministerial revo-  
 lution here seems to have been concerted with the French  
 king, or at least he was regularly acquainted with the  
 steps taken to bring it about, in order to keep up his  
 spirits, and divert him from all thoughts of resuming the  
 negociations for peace upon the foot of the preliminaries.  
 It had, nor could it fail to have, the desired effect, espe-  
 cially as his most Christian Majesty had reason to believe,  
 that the Duke of MARLBOROUGH would either be re-  
 moved, or forced by ill usage to resign his employ-  
 ments.

THE



THE dismissal of Lord GODOLPHIN, the Duke's near relation as well as intimate and useful partner in all councils and measures for carrying on the government, was certainly a cruel stroke upon his Grace: however, by the persuasion of his friends, and contrary to the intentions and expectations of his enemies, he continued to command the army in Flanders: labouring under the greatest difficulties and discouragements at home, supplanted in the favour of his sovereign, and vilely misrepresented to the people, his martial presence of mind in the field forsook him not; he was calm and undisturbed. With a superior military skill he deceived by feint marches the French, and unexpectedly \* passed their lines (which VILLARS had vainly boasted to be the ne plus ultra to his Grace's arms) without the loss of a man.

IT was looked upon to be the boldest attempt that had been made during the war.

HE then laid siege to Bouchain: the Dutch Deputies, the general officers, and the Duke's particular friends, were in opinion against it: they thought it impracticable

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\* Aug. 5, 1711.

to take a place situated in a morass, well fortified, with a good garrison in it, and in the sight of a superior army; and considering the fatal consequences of a disgrace before it, in his situation at court, they endeavoured to divert him from such a dangerous enterprize. His Grace persevered, they submitted to his judgment, and the town was taken \*.

THE honour of this his last campaign, more hazardous and glorious than any of his former, was intirely due to him. Prince EUGENE was absent, and the plan of operations was projected and executed by his own authority and conduct only. It opened a way to penetrate next year into France: the French were not at all alarmed at it; they knew care would be taken in England to prevent it by removing the Duke.

† THEY had got into a secret negociation with our new ministry: they did not doubt but the advantages they should reap from thence, would more than recompense the losses they had suffered by the Duke of

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\* Sept. 11, 1711.

† April 22, 1711. Torcy privately sent some propositions of peace into England.



MARLBOROUGH's arms. His Grace was \* dismissed from all his employments the latter end of the year.

THIS was the last and finishing stroke to the old administration; the consequences of which, with respect to the glory, the interest, and trade of this nation, shall be more fully explained hereafter.

HAVING detained your Lordship so long in giving you an account of the most extraordinary catastrophe in politics that perhaps ever happened in any country, I shall venture to trespass a little farther, and present you with a summary of the contents of this second part of my letters.

THE recovery of Spain and the West Indies in favour of the house of Austria, which the French king, in violation of the most solemn treaty, had seized upon in favour of the Duke of ANJOU, was the object of the engagements contracted by the Emperor, Queen ANNE, and the States, between themselves and other powers, for undertaking and carrying on the war against France and Spain with their utmost force.

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\* Dec. 20, 1711.

THE uninterrupted series of wonderful successes by the confederate army, in all parts, against the common enemy for many years, afforded a hopeful prospect of obtaining that desirable end.

THE distressed condition of the house of Bourbon, obliged France to propose and enter into conferences and negotiations with the principal allies, for putting an end to the war. The restitution of Spain and the West Indies to King CHARLES was avowedly by France agreed to be the *conditio sine qua non* of holding those conferences and negotiations: during the course of them, the French made use of their utmost dexterity to deceive and divide the allies, and by plausible pretences of their being disposed to peace, to irritate the people of England and Holland against their respective ministers, as being unreasonably determined to perpetuate the war for their own interest.

THE steadiness and harmony of the allies, in not suffering themselves to be amused or divided, and their candid behaviour in being ready to accept of any expedient that was practicable, and would answer the object of the war and of the negotiations, intirely disappointed the fallacious designs of France. In the mean time, the irre-

fistible



sistible forces of the allies continued to make new conquests in the Netherlands, and the French finding no other resource to save their own country, reduced their several demands of a partition, which they had made in favour of the Duke of ANJOU at Gertruydenberg, to that of granting them Sicily and Sardinia, as a sure means to induce him to give up the rest of the Spanish monarchy to King CHARLES.

THE Dutch plenipotentiaries on the part of the allies, far from making any objection to this demand, gave them fairly to understand, that if the French would give them a sufficient security for the restitution at the same time of the rest of the Spanish monarchy to King CHARLES (which was declared to be the condition for granting Sicily and Sardinia to PHILIP) the allies would immediately facilitate the conclusion of a general peace. And there is great reason to believe that the French king, when he saw that VILLARS could not prevent the taking of Douay, nor the arms of the allies from making a forcible progress towards the frontiers of France that campaign, had let the Duke of ANJOU know, that his affairs would not permit him to support him any longer, and that it could not be expected, that he should ruin himself to maintain him upon the throne.

IN

IN this great crisis of an expedient to accommodate the partition that had been proposed, the power of the new favourite at the English court, in concert with her chief operator Mr. HARLEY and his associates, and in consequence of the ferment occasioned in the nation by the trial, or rather acquittal, of Dr. SACHEVEREL, was grown so prevalent and popular, that a total change of the administration was, without any form or hesitation, determined: and if it was not concerted with the French king, yet care was taken to give him so early notice of it, as to make him lay aside all thoughts of peace upon the terms of the preliminaries, and to cause the negotiations at Gertruydenberg to be broken off in such an extraordinary manner.

THE END OF PART II.





## ERRATA.

Page 42. line 4. *for* part, *read* port. P. 53. l. 15. and p. 55. l. 8. *for* entrenched, *r.* intrenched. P. 58. l. 13. *for* entrenchments, *r.* intrenchments. P. 89. l. 12. *for* 1706, *r.* 1706-7. P. 93. l. 16. *for* the scandalous peace he, *r.* the scandalous peace which he. P. 96. l. 8. *for* offensive and defensive, *r.* defensive and offensive. P. 104. l. 16. *after* worth, *dele* their. P. 131. l. 2. *for* and receive, *r.* and to receive. P. 133. l. 7. *for* the fine quâ non, *r.* the condition fine quâ non. P. 170. in the note, *for* page 155, *r.* page 169. P. 181. l. 18. *for* Flanders, *r.* Flandres. P. 189. l. 13. *for* the breach was, *r.* the breach now was.

# ERRATA.

Page 42, line 4. For part, read part. P. 53, l. 15, and p. 55, l. 8. For en-  
 tranced, or interrupted. P. 58, l. 13. For circumstances, or interrup-  
 tions. P. 89, l. 12. For 1706, or 1706-7. P. 93, l. 16. For the tem-  
 dulous peace has, or the scandalous peace which has. P. 95, l. 8. For  
 offensive and defensive, or defensive and offensive. P. 104, l. 16. For  
 writing, not their. P. 131, l. 2. For and receive, or and to receive.  
 P. 137, l. 7. For the line and now, or the conclusion the end now.  
 P. 140, in the note, for page 155, or page 156. P. 181, l. 18. For  
 P. 181, or P. 182. P. 189, l. 13. For the breach was, or the breach  
 now was.



